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ABSTRACT

Criminal Justice and the Mentally Retarded
(September 1977)

Joseph P, Cozzolino, B.S., California State College
M.S., California State College
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by;

Professor Ellis Olim

The present work examines how courts in the United States decide
the issue of criminal responsibility when faced with a mentally

retarded defendant.

Mental Retardation is defined as subaverage intell-

igence existing concurently with significant deficits in adaptive

behavior and originating during the first eighteen years of life.
Most of the research results in the field of mental retardation are
clouded by faulty diagnoses caused by problematic instruments and
procedures.

Although these results are not clear, data bearing on

issues such as incidence, ability levels as related to classification,
and relation to criminality are examined.

Anglo-American thoughts on criminal responsibility are traced back
to the twelfth century with the introduction of the concept of mens rea

into the English legal system.

Mens rea or "guilty mind" has been

interpreted to mean moral knowledge, and knowledge
cerning ones behavior, intentions and motives.

of;

consequences con-

Prior to -he acceptance

conviction.
of mens rea, only the criminal act itself was necessary for
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In order to Identify individuals who should
not be held responsible,

courts developed tests and procedures.

Since legal systems are

heavily dependent on precedent many of the current
problems in
identifying these individuals have roots early in this history.

The M Naghten case in 1843 is the most significant occurrence
in
the history of thought on legal insanity.

The M'Naghten rules are

currently used in most of the United States.
t

-he

Other tests in use are

irresistible— impulse test, the Model Penal Code standard, and

the product rule.
criticism.

An examination of this criticism reveals a similarity

in content.
another.

All of these tests have received more than ample

Indeed, many problems tend to be passed from one test to

Since decisions regarding criminal responsibility are

inevitably subjective and they are made in an emotionally charged
atmosphere, it is likely that many critics also sense the impossibility
of making a fair judgement in that situation.

Punishment and treatment frequently occupy a central place in

writings on the topic of criminal responsibility.

Those relieved of

criminal responsibility are to receive treatment and those held respon-

sible are to receive punishment.

This thinking, therefore, equates

prisons with punishment and mental health and mental retardation
institutions with treatment.

The concepts of punishment and treatment

are defined and compared on a theoretical level.

In order to determine

how well these institutions function within their theoretical roles
an examination of their histories and how they presently function is
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conducted.

This examination reveals that all three types of institutions

frequently represent punishment in the extreme.

In order for the issue

of criminal responsibility to have any meaning, those
relieved of

responsibility must, if incarceration becomes necessary, receive
treatment.

Normalization, a dominant principle in human services, is defined
as the use of means which are as culturally normative as possible
in order to establish and/or maintain personal behavior and character-

istics which are as culturally normative as possible.

The application

of normalization to the issue under consideration indicates that it

would not be wise to relieve all retarded persons of criminal responsibility.

Rather, retarded persons should be considered responsible

and only if it can be shown that an accused individual lacks the ability
to assume this responsibility should relief be granted.

This work recommends that the issue of criminal responsibility be

removed from criminal proceedings.

The concept of mans rea is inter-

preted to mean the ability to make rational decisions.

Since guardian-

ship and competency also speak to this ability a finding of incompetence
in a guardianship hearing is equated with the inability to assume

criminal responsibility.

Such a procedure would make it possible to

decide criminal responsibility for a given individual outside of the
emotionally charged atmosphere of a criminal proceeding.

Recommendations

regarding the implementation of this procedure are also included.
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PREFACE

The motivation to produce this work grew out of the author's

experiences in the field of mental retardation.

Changes which have

occurred and continue to occur in the field are enabling retarded
persons to be a part of the mainstream of American life.

The times

when retarded persons could effectively be segregated for life
from the rest of society are slowly dying away.

As a result of this

increased desegregation, the author has found himself on a number
of occasions either accompanying mentally retarded clients to court

or speaking to police or prosecuting attorneys regarding the behavior
of clients.

In these instances, the responses of the criminal justice

system can only he described as consistently inconsistent.
This confusion on the part of the criminal justice system prompted

the author to explore the issue of criminal responsibility.

This

work is designed to serve as an educational device for legislators,
persons involved with our criminal justice system, and persons concerned

with the well-being of the mentally retarded.

When this project was

conceived it was hoped that the recommendations made in the final chapter

would at some future time be adopted as law.
literature was
In order to accomplish this, a search of relevant

conducted.

Since the vast bulk of literature on criminal responsibility

much of the
addresses the issue from the perspective of mental illness,

discussion revolves around mental illness and so-called insanity.
of
approach has been to examine the issue through the perspective

The
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existing literature and then to determine the relevance that material
has for the retarded person.

This document does not include a com-

prehensive review of the types of treatment which should be provided
to offenders.

However, since what happens to an offender cannot be

completely divorced from decisions regarding responsibility, the
disposition of offenders relieved of responsibility is discussed in
the final chapter.

Finally, this work is limited in that while it

can examine the problems which have occurred in determining criminal

responsibility and recommend changes consistent with current knowledge,
it cannot measure the probable impact of these recommended changes

on our criminal justice system.

The paper will be divided into seven chapters.

Chapter I clearly

specifies the problem and its importance.

Chapter II contains a discussion of mental retardation including
a description of the condition, its prevalence, identification and

classification, and its relationship to criminal activity.
In Chapter III the history of thought on criminal responsibility
in Anglo-Saxon law is traced in order to provide historical perspective.

The M'Naghten or other later rules are not considered in this discussion.
Of particular interest in this chapter is the determination of how rules
or laws regarding criminal responsibility are developed.

Chapter IV examines, contemporary rules regarding criminal responsibility,

Included here is a review and critique of the M'Naghten rules,

Penal Code
the irresistible- impulse test, the product rule, the Model

recommendations, and other proposals.

X

Chapter V examines the punishment—versus— treatment controversy.
In order to treat the topic adequately it is examined on both

theoretical and applied levels.

This topic is critical since there

is a considerable amount of controversy currently over the dis-

tinctions which have been drawn by various authors between punishment
and treatment.

Chapter VI examines the concept of normalization and its significance for determining criminal responsibility.

Chapter VII specifies the recommended changes in methods of

determining criminal responsibility among mentally retarded offenders.
Additionally, a limited discussion is presented of what considerations
the court should take into account when deciding the disposition of
a case where the defendant has been found not responsible.
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CHAPTER

I

THE PROBLEM

The purpose of criminal law is, practically speaking, to define
and reduce the incidence of criminal behavior within a given society.

The rising crime rate in the United States testifies to the fact that
the present criminal law system is failing in one of its purposes
(Clark, 1970).

The other purpose, that of defining criminal behavior, has been

equally difficult to achieve.

Some writers have stated that criminality

snould be based upon whether or not an act interferes with the public

peace (Bishop, 1882, p. 125).

This, of course, is an oversimplification.

In fact, the defining of criminal behavior involves two separate pro-

blems.

First, society must decide which acts are criminal and label

them as such.

Second, the conditions which render an individual incap-

able of committing criminal acts must be identified.
law,

In Anglo-American

individuals are not considered criminally responsible when these

conditions are mat.

Therefore, regardless of the behavior such persons

exhibit, their acts are not labelled criminal.

The issue under investigation here is how the criminal justice
system makes decisions regarding criminal responsibility for mentally
retarded persons.

The making of these decisions is dependent, of

course, on the fact that society as a whole, rather than a few isolated

individuals, has an impact on the specification of justice.

The product

of this work will be recommendations concerning how courts should decide

criminal responsibility for the mentally retarded.
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The determination of criminal responsibility for persons
with

mental disabilities has been, and continues to be, a
deceptively complex problem for our legal system.

Superficially, it appears that

courts might simply define the types and degrees of seriousness of

mental defects which may be considered to relieve a defendant of
responsibility, relying heavily on the opinions of psychiatrists and

other experts for guidance (as has been done).

In fact, however, these

experts are seldom able to agree among themselves on this criterion.

During trials in American courts a tacit assumption is made that
persons are responsible for their behavior.

When the responsibility

question is raised by the defense, two issues must be decided.

First,

has evidence been produced which indicates that the defendant is or was
at the time the illegal act was committed suffering from a mental con-

dition (defined by law) which could relieve him of criminal responsibility?

Second, if he was suffering from such a condition, does he

have the characteristics which are called for in the criminal responsibility test in use in that state?

Only when both questions are

answered affirmatively is relief granted.

Since it is the respon-

sibility of a jury to answer these questions, the test utilized by a

given state is primarily found within instructions to juries.
Currently, in the United States, the following tests are used to

determine criminal responsibility:
.The M'Naghten Rules

.Irresistible-Impulse Test
.The Product Rule
.The Model Penal Code

3

At leas t theoretically , criminal responsibility and these tests

are dependent on the concept of mens rea .

Mens rea

,

in Anglo-American

law, states that in order for an act to be criminal, a "guilty mind"

must be present.

Mens rea involves moral knowledge and knowledge of

consequences concerning one's behavior, intentions, and motives.
/

Additionally, mens rea assumes the ability to make rational choices.

The answer to the question of criminal responsibility has profound

implications for a defendant.
ence between life and death.

In extreme cases it can mean the differIn less dramatic instances it can mean the

difference between release and incarceration or treatment versus punishment.

Treatment versus punishment is used as a major argument by many

authors when calling for change.

The exact meaning of this argument

will be explored in a later chapter.

Although numerous writers have addressed the problem of criminal
responsibility, most efforts have tended to focus exclusively on mental

illness as the defect which limits responsibility.

Mental Retardation,

while it may be mentioned as a limiting condition is almost never fully
explored.

For example. The American Bar Foundation, the legal research

affiliate of the American Bar Association, has recently published an
(Brakel
intensive study entitled The Mentally Disabled and the Law,

Rock, 1971).

&

of mental
In the Introduction to that study the definition

disability includes mental deficiency

(p.

xv)

.

However, xn dxscussxng

attention to those issues
criminal law this study does not direct any

which concern the mentally retarded.
discussions and
Why the retarded have been excluded from these

certainly been a generally
studies is unclear, but the retarded have

4

ignored group until recently (Kanner, 1964,

p.

7).

The neglect cannot

be attributed to a lack of contact between our
courts and the mentally

retarded (Marsh, Friel, and Eissler, 1975), for the retarded
appear to

have greater contact with the criminal justice system than the
incidence or this condition in society would seem to warrant.

And there

is reason to believe that the contact between the criminal justice

system and the mentally retarded will increase.

The primary reason for

this is the current evolution of philosophy within the field of mental

retardation.

At the turn of the century professionals in the field

believed that institutionalization was the only option for the vast

majority of the retarded (e.g. Fernald, 1912).

Recently, many have

recognized that the detrimental effects of institutionalization out-

weigh its advantages (Roos, 1970,

p.

34), and thus, institutionalization

of the retarded is currently being discouraged (Luckey a Newman, 1975;

O'Conner

& Sitkei,

1975).

Second, community alternatives, consistent

with this change in philosophy, are being developed.

These alternatives

have decreased the number of admittances to institutions and have also
enabled institutionalized individuals to move to community based

residences (Conely, 1973,

p.

82).

Third, class action right-to-treat-

ment suits are being heard and, at least in one instance, the court
•has granted a summary judgement including the requirement to provide the

least restrictive possible residential setting for retarded individuals
(Davis v. Watkins 1974).

Findings such as this one can have dramatic

impact on the residential services provided to retarded persons.

It

persons
seems reasonable to conclude that as the number of retarded
increased
living within community settings increases, there will be
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contact between these individuals and our courts.

The continual development of community-based residential services

demands that the presently ambiguous laws regarding the mentally
retarded offender be addressed and clarified, and a set of guidelines

ha formed for the use of courts in deciding criminal responsibility
when confronted with a mentally retarded defendant.

6

CHAPTER

II

MENTAL RETARDATION

Mental retardation is a label applied by society
to a relatively
small group of individuals.

While this type of labeling may be useful

not only for the individual in question but also for society,
it also
has potential negative consequences.

There is a tendency to associate

characteristics with labeled individuals that are not inherent in the

definition of the label.

Why this is so is not clear but such a

relationship appears to be universal.

Much of the research which ex-

plores community attitudes toward the retarded assumes this relationship
exists.

These associated characteristics tend to support the erroneous

belief that labeled individuals are similar, in many ways, to one
another and that the differences between these persons and the rest of

society are greater than the similarities.
The present author starts with the assumption that retarded persons are more similar to others than different.

Moreover, the author

contends that the variability which is found among the general popu-

lation is usually also present in the retarded population.

Such an

orientation demands that differences between the mentally retarded and
others which are not inherent in the definition of retardation must be
demonstrated.

Where such differences have not been clearly demonstrated,

the assumption must be that they do not exist.
In order for the reader to obtain a basic understanding of mental

retardation, this chapter first provides a definition of the condition
and includes a discussion of the functions and methods of diagnosis.
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The characteristics of the retarded and the causes of this
condition
are also explored.
Of paramount importance in this chapter is a description of the

ability of retarded persons to function independently within the

community and govern their own lives.

Since the severity of the

handicap subsumed under mental retardation is variable, the descriptions of these abilities will be made in relation to different degrees

retardation.

Finally, research bearing on the incidence of this

condition and its relation to criminal behavior is presented.

Definition and Diagnosis

The most widely accepted definition of mental retardation and the

one accepted by the American Association of Mental Deficiency states
that "Mental retardation refers to significantly subaverage general

intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in

adaptive behavior, and manifested during the developmental period"
(Grossman, 1973, p. 1).

As Heber (1962) has pointed out, the concept

of mental retardation emphasizes the present level of functioning of
the individual.

This definition can be divided into three components.

First, the

retardation must have originated during the developmental period.

The

upper age limit of the developmental period has been specified as

eighteen years (Grossman, 1973, p. 11)*

This age limit is believed to

be an aid in discriminating between mental retardation and other

disorders of human behavior.

Second, intellectual functioning must be
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significantly subaverage.

Intellectual functioning is that which is

measured by intelligence tests, and subaverage defines any test score

which is more than two standard deviations below the mean of the tests.
In general, this is a score of less than seventy.

Third, subaverage

intelligence is not sufficient without a concurrent existence of

adaptive behavior deficits.

Adaptive behavior means the effectiveness

with which a person meets the standards of personal and social
responsibility expected of his age and cultural group.
The inclusion of adaptive behavior in the definition of mental

retardation is fairly recent and provides several advantages.

It

ensures that persons are labeled retarded only when they are not able
to meet the conduct standards established by society.

The criterion

of adaptive behavior should enable many persons who score low on

intelligence tests to escape the label of retardation and thus avoid
any of the undesirable effects such labeling creates.

Additionally,

intelligence is an abstraction which lacks any agreed-upon definition
or any constellation of tools necessary to measure its components.

Intelligence tests, regardless of their name, were never designed to

evaluate the global concept of intelligence.

Rather, these tests

originated with the desire to identify students who were destined
to fail in school.

It is likely that problem solving skills differ

between school and other life settings.

Therefore, the inclusion of

solely on the
adaptive behavior provides a check on judgements made

basis of low intelligence test scores.
definition
The observant reader has probably noted that the
makes no
supplied by the American Association of Mental Deficiency
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mention of the irreversibility of the condition.

In fact, a consider-

able amount of data exists which demonstrates that intelligence test
scores can and do change oyer time.

Clarke and Clarke (1954) tested

and retested with the same instrument a group of individuals
who had

been diagnosed as retarded.

When a period of two years had passed

between testings the authors found that the mean had risen by 6.5
points.

Other researchers have found similar results (New York State

Department of Mental Hygiene, 1955 and Kirk, 1965).

Although mental retardation has a clear definition and, as Bialor
(1970) has pointed out, the definition of emotional disturbance

has proven more elusive due to the diversity of syndromes grouped
under that label, confusion between the two conditions still exists.
For example, Latimer (1970), through interviews with over one thousand

citizens in Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio, found considerable confusion

over the purpose of mental health and mental retardation facilities.
At least one-third of the persons interviewed believed that most of
the mentally retarded are mentally ill.

A second study by Winthrop

and Taylor (1957) found that sixty-two percent of the subjects believed

mental retardation to be mental illness and forty three percent felt it
could be cured as if it were mental illness.
It is possible that one reason mental illness and mental retard-

ation are viewed similarly is the fact that they both represent deviance.
and
Every society has established standards of acceptable behavior,

deviant.
individuals who habitually violate these standards are labeled

differences
Such a label usually leads members of society to view the
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between themselves and deviant persons as greater than they actually
are and obscures the similarities.

This situation can lead to fear

of the deviant person (Gottlieb & Corman, 1975 and Lewis, 1973) and

eventually, to the sanctioning of the abuse of such persons (Hobbs,

1975a p. 26).

Thus, it may be that society views mental illness and

retardation as similar to one another but different from the rest of
society.

The definition of mental retardation can only be made within the
context of a given society.

Since deviation as represented by mental

retardation implies a standard set of expectations regarding normal
development (Uzgiris, 1970).

A standard set of expectations and the

behaviors which lie outside of that standard can only be defined

within a societal context.
The labeling of a person as mentally retarded can have two purposes.

It can first help to identify persons who are in need of re-

medial or special services.

This provides help to the individual and

also assists society in preserving its norms and standards.

The second

is to identify and separate out the labeled person, again assisting

society, but often at the expense of the individual labeled as deviant.

The labeling of a person as mentally retarded in the United States

usually comes about through a formal diagnosis.

The diagnosis as

intellmentioned in the definition of mental retardation should use
and deterigence test results, an assessment of adaptive behavior,

originated.
minations regarding the age during which the retardation
label others as
Unfortunately for society, individuals empowered to

criteria, and many
retarded often use only intelligence testing as
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individuals are inaccurately labeled as retarded.

Even much of the

research regarding the retarded uses this single criterion.

The

erroneous practice is so widespread in fact, that unless otherwise
noted, the research cited in this work has primarily used intelligence

tests to make a diagnosis.

According to the standard established by

the American Association on Mental Deficiency (Grossman, 1973, p. 17),
a person must manifest deficiencies in both intelligence test scores

and adaptive behavior.

A finding of the requisite deficit in intell-

igence testing without the concurrent deficiency in adaptive behavior
does not call for a diagnosis of mental retardation.

The converse of

this situation would also not justify a diagnosis of retardation.

Intelligence tests are the most widely used standardized test in
our society, probably because our culture places such a high premium

on performance in academic settings.

It has been estimated that over

250,000,000 intelligence tests are administered each year (Hobbs, 1975
a,

p.

45).

These tests are administered in a variety of settings in-

cluding industry, schools, and the military.

A considerable amount of

ones.
time and energy is spent in developing new tests and improving old

United
Although intelligence tests are widely used and accepted in the
are not
States, they are frequently misunderstood and test results

infrequently misinterpreted.

For example, it is not unusual to hear

innate intellectual
testers interpret an obtained IQ as indicative of

potential or ability.

of the
In order to gain a better understanding

of the history of taeir
meaning of these tests, a brief examination

development follows.
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In the early part of the nineteenth century
in France there

developed an interest in establishing methods to accurately
differentiate between individuals with varying mental abilities.

This interest

primarily grew out of the work of Jean Esquirol and Edoward Sequin,
both interested in the remediation of mental retardation (Freeman,
1962,
p.

4).

Both men attempted to develop ways of classifying individuals

by degrees of disability, but neither of them was successful.

Esquirol

even attempted to make these discriminations on the basis of physical

measurements, particularly the size and shape of the skull.

It was

not, however, until the work of Binet that the intelligence test as

we know it today was developed.
During the 1890’s Alfred Binet conducted a considerable amount of

research regarding mental abilities.

His research focused on issues

such as memory, imagination, attention, comprehension, and suggestibility.

In 1903 the French Minister of Public Instruction approved a

plan which called for the education of children who frequently failed.
The plan called for the removal of these children from regular classes
and their placement in a special school.

In order to accomplish this,

a means of identifying the children was needed, and Binet was asked to

develop an instrument which would make the required discrimination.

In

collaboration with Simon he undertook the task and designed the intelligence test referred to as the Binet-Simon scale (Murphy, 1949,

354).

p.

Within this scale there were a series of tests requiring the naming of
objects, comparisons of lengths of lines, the repetition of digits,
the completion of sentences, and the comprehension of questions,

i'ne

scale was revised in 1908, and in 1910 it was adapted for use in the
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United States by Goddard.

The test devised by Binet and Simon served

as a model for all the intelligence tests which followed.

As a matter

of fact, the Stanf ord-Binet, the most recent revision of the Binet-

Smon,

is one of the most frequently used intelligence tests in the

United States today.

What must be kept in mind about these tests is

that they were designed to predict success in a school setting, and,
in.

fact, that is where their greatest predictive validity lies.

Table

1 presents the correlations that are obtained between the Stanford-

Sinet and grades received in both elementary and high school (Freeman,
1962, p. 215).

with the

Other tests which have been developed correlate highly

S tanf ord-Binet .

For example, another widely used set of

instruments are the Wechsler scales.

The correlation coefficient

between the children’s scale of the Wechsler and the Stanf ord-Binet
is between .64 and .76 (Freeman, 1962, p. 272).

Instruments for measuring adaptive behavior have not received the

attention that intelligence tests have.

For many years the Vineland

Scale of Social Maturity (Doll, 1936) was the standard tool used to

make this assessment.

This scale consists of one hundred seventeen

items, ordered from least to most difficult, and covered behavioral

areas such as self help, occupation, communication, and socialization.

The information which this scale organizes is not obtained directly

from the individual being evaluated but, rather, from another person
who knows the subject well.

reliability coefficients.

The Vineland scale has produced reasonable

Doll (1936) reported a coefficient of .92

and Hurst (1962) reported that the reliability was not likely to fall

below .80.

Correlations between the Vineland Scale and inrelligence
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TABLE

1

Correlations between Stanford-Bir.et Scores and School Grades
by Academic Subject

Elementary School
Subject

Reading
Arithmetic
Spelling

High School

Correlation

Subject

60 or higher
.50 or higher
.45 or higher

Reading Comprehension
Knowledge of Literature
English Usage
History
Algebra
Biology
Geometry
Spelling
Reading Rate

.

Correlatic
.70
60
.60
.60
.60
.55
.50
.

.45
.45
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test scores have been shown to vary from .41 to .82 (Shakespeare,
1970).

Since the Vineland Scale proved to be unsatisfactory in dis-

criminating between fine differences in adaptive behavior, another
instrument known as the American Association for Mental Deficiancy
Scales of Adaptive Behavior (AAMD Scales) was developed (Nihira,
Foster, Shellhaas, & Leland, 1969).

Today, this is the most commonly

U3ed tool to assess adaptive behavior and the one recommended by the

American Association on Mental Deficiency.

The project which led to

the development of the AAMD Scales was sponsored by the American

Association on Mental Deficiency and had as its goals:

(1)

to review

literature in areas related to adaptive behavior, e.g., medicine,
education, sociology, child development, mental retardation, etc.; (2)
to evaluate adaptive behavior as an independent dimension;

(3)

to develop

a more precise definition of the concept of adaptive behavior; and (4)

to establish a library on adaptive behavior as it relates to mental and

emotional disturbance (Leland, 1973).

The scale conceptualizes adaptive

behavior into three behavioral sets.

The first, independent functioning,

is the ability of the person to successfully accomplish those tasks or

activities demanded by the critical survival demands of the community
and by the typical community expectations for different ages.

Personal

responsibility, the second set, is the willingness of the individual to

accamplish critical tasks he is able to perform and his ability to
assume responsibility for his behavior.

The third, social responsi

member
bility, is the ability to accept responsibility as a community

and to exhibit behaviors expected by that community.

The original

16

AAilD

Scale was produced in 1969 and revised in 1974 (Fogelman, 1974).

The scale has a reliability of approximately .62 and appears to have
some validity.

For example, it has been shown to discriminate well

between five functionally homogeneous residential units at an institution for the retarded.

Intelligence tests and adaptive behavior scales not only diagnose
a person as retarded but also classify the person as mildly, moderately,

severely or profoundly retarded.

Since these two instruments do not

correlate perfectly there will be times when their diagnoses and
classifications are in agreement and times when they are not.

As

mentioned above, the American Association on Mental Deficiency has
stated that both intelligence test scores and adaptive behavior scores

must fall within the retarded range for a parson to be diagnosed as
such.

Unfortunately, the association provides no guidelines for class-

ifying retarded persons when these instruments estimate the severity
of retardation differently.

If, however, we consider normal intell-

igence or normal adaptive behavior as another classification along a
skill dimension, guidance in making such classification decisions

might be gained.

An examination of Table

2

is helpful in this analysis.

In Table 2 X represents a score obtained from either an intelligence test

or an adaptive behavior scale.

As shown in the table, there is no

difficulty in classifying individual A.

With individual

B,

however,

the
the adaptive behavior score indicates normal functioning and

intelligence test score indicates mild retardation.

In these cases the

higher
American Association on Mental Deficiency recommends tnat the
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TABLE

2

An Illustration of Several Different Combinations of Intelligence
Test and Adaptive Behavior Scores
Individual A
Intelligence
Adaptive
Behavior CAB) TestClT)
.

Classif ication

Moderate
Severe

Profound

Individual C
AB
IT

X

Normal
Mild

Individual B
AB
IT

X

X

X

X
X
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score be chosen in making a diagnosis.
»

When classifying any retarded

it makes sense to follow the association's recommendation

by choosing the higher score and thus, consistency in diagnosis and
classification would be achieved.

Therefore, although Individual C

in Table 2 has an adaptive behavior score which indicates moderate

ratardatibn, because his intelligence test score is indicative of mild

retardation, the individual should be classified as mildly retarded.

Characteristics

This section presents information in an attempt to define the

characteristics of the mentally retarded population as a whole.

Particular attention is paid to the relationship of mental retardation
to sex, race, socio-economic class, personality, and adaptive behavior.

The data presented originated either from agency surveys or household
surveys.

In the former, agencies that are likely to come in contact

with and provide services for the mentally retarded report the number
of cases they have identified.

Household surveys involve investigating

all or a representative sample of the residents in a given geographical
area.

In general, agency surveys present lower prevalence rates than

household surveys because all the mentally retarded are not typically

known to agencies, it is difficult to identify all the relevant agencies,
and not all agencies cooperate with research efforts.

The last part

of mental
of this section provides a very brief discussion of the causes

retardation.

The research presented relies on intelligence test scores

for the diagnosis of retardation.

Studies that systematically evaluated
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adaptive behavior are identified as such in the work.
In general, researchers have found the incidence of
mental

retardation to be higher among males than females.
& Cooper,

(Lemkaw, Tietze,

1942, p. 275-288, New York State Department of Mental

H^gience, Mental Health Research Unit, 1965).

The proportion of males

to females in these studies is approximately 1.5 to 1.

Whether or

not this difference is real or artif actual is unclear.

It is possible

that as Lemkaw (1956) has suggested, males are more apt to have their

retardation "discovered" since in our society they are more likely to
get into trouble than are females.

Since the intelligence tests typically administered have been

standardized on white middle class Americans, conclusions regarding
any relationship between mental retardation and race remain cloudy.

A recent study (Conley, 1973,

p.

22)

investigated the relationship

between mental retardation and socio-economic class for children bet-

ween the ages of five and nineteen.

Five classes were identified on

the basis of occupation, income for the head of the household, and
education.

This study found that children

bom

into the lowest class

are thirteen times more likely to be retarded than those
top three classes.

bom

into the

Upon examining the interaction between race and

class, these investigators found that children belonging to the lowest

class are about seven times more likely to be retarded than their

counterparts in the top three classes.

Likewise, nonwhite children in

the lowest class are twice as likely to be retarded as nonwhite

children in the top three classes.

Within each socio-economic class.
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the prevalence of mental retardation among nonwhite
children is higher

than for white children by a multiple of three in the
lowest class
and thirteen in the highest three classes.

Degree of retardation

was also found to be affected by socio-economic class and
race.

Those

children with more severe impairments (IQ less than fifty) are seven
times more likely to come from the lowest class than from the highest

three socio-economic classes.

Additionally, nonwhites are more likely

than whites to suffer from severe retardation regardless of socio-

economic class, being twice as likely in the lowest class and seven
times more likely in the top three classes.

Very little research has been conducted on the personality

variables associated with mental retardation (Cromwell, 1959).

The

interest here, however, is not in thoroughly reviewing this area but,
rather, in focusing on literature which examines the relationship

between emotional disturbance and mental retardation.

This decision

is based upon the assumption stated earlier that the retarded are more

similar to than different from the rest of the population.

Therefore,

the author believes that, in general, personality development among
the retarded is similar to that of others.

But, since the mentally

retarded experience considerable failure within society as it is

currently defined, and since they are frequently ostracized, an

examination of the relationship between emotional disturbance and

mental retardation is warranted.

A number of studies have found the incidence of emotional disturexpected.
bance to be higher among the mentally retarded than would be
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Blatt (1958) found that retarded students in regular or special
classes had a higher frequency of personality maladjustments as com-

pared to other children.

Weaver (1946) used eight thousand retarded

military inductees as subjects in an investigation of the adjustment
of the mentally retarded in military service.

He found that forty four

percent of the males and thirty eight percent of the females became

psychiatric problems or were repeatedly found guilty of misconduct.

Dewan (1948), studying the emotional adjustment of Canadian mentally
retarded army recruits found that forty seven percent were considered
to be emotionally unstable by psychiatric examination as opposed to

twenty percent in the non-retarded group.

While it is clear that there is a relatively high predisposition
for emotional disturbance among the mentally retarded, the exact

magnitude of this predisposition is difficult to determine (Balthazar
& Stevens,

1975, p. 9).

The difficulty is due to the variability in

diagnostic techniques used to determine both mental retardation and
emotional disturbance and additionally, the relative difficulty in

defining and making any diagnoses of emotional disturbance.

A number of researchers have attempted to identify the behaviors

which are associated with mild, moderate, severe, and profound
retardation.

The profoundly retarded are persons who need lifelong

care and may even be unable to feed themselves or take care of their
toileting needs (Gunzburg, 1968, p. 27).

These persons also require

of
nursing care, have, at best, primitive speech, and are incapable

independent functioning (Allen

& Allen,

1970, p. 3).

The profoundly
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retarded usually have considerable nervous system
impairment (Stevens,
1964, p. 4), and other types of handicapping conditions
are frequently

present, such as blindness and gross physical anomalies.

Association of Mental Deficiency CGrossman, 1973,

p.

29)

The American
indicates that

a person classified as profoundly retarded by the
adaptive behavior

scale is not capable of using all eating utensils and cannot
indepen-

dently take care of his dressing or bathing needs.
Severely retarded persons also frequently have considerable central

nervous system damage as well as other handicapping conditions (Stevens,
1964, p. 4).

Motor development and language and speech are con-

siderably retarded and these persons need lifelong support and super-

vision (Gunzburg, 1963,

p.

27 and Allen & Allen, 1970, p. 3).

The

American Association on Mental Deficiency, in categorizing the severely
retarded on the basis of adaptive behavior, states that these persons

cannot totally use all eating utensils, need supervision in bathing,
cannot work competitively, and realize money has value but cannot

make change.
The moderately retarded group represents a dramatic departure from
the severely and profoundly retarded.

Moderately retarded persons do

not frequently have neuropathological conditions or other handicapping

conditions (Stevens, 1964, p. 5).

These persons can take care of their

bodily needs independently, recognize words, may read, and may make
change (Grossman, 1973,

p.

31).

According to Stevens (1964,

p.

5),

some of these persons may be capable of competitive employment and

independent functioning.
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xb.e

most capable group of mentally retarded persons is
represented

by the mildly retarded.

A mildly retarded person is usually identified

after one or two years in school when he has encountered some trouble.

Generally, this level of retardation is only apparent when engaging

m

academic pursuits.

These people are usually capable of competitive

employment, and they frequently marry and live independently (Allen
&

Allen, 1970, p.

Stevens, 1964, p. 6).

3

The mildly retarded can

travel independently, communicate and understand complex verbal
concepts, write letters, and can make change and purchases indepen-

dently (Grossman, 1973,

p.

32-33).

As Gunzburg (1968, p. 184)

has stated, it could be argued that the mildly retarded have a

sufficient intellectual level for social competence provided their

personality make-up is adequate.

Since the "normal" population can be

described the same way, the wisdom of labeling this group retarded at
all is questionable.

From the above, it seems that the mildly retarded and some of the

moderately retarded are capable of independent functioning in the
community.

A number of studies which bear on this issue have been

conducted.

Investigations by Krishef (1955), Carson (1965), Porter

and Milazzo (1958), Charles (1953), Miller (1965), and Bailer, Charles
and Miller (1967)

,

demonstrate that while; mildly retarded persons

become labeled as such because of school or other problems, these
individuals as adults are typically assimilated into the community
and cease to be identified as retarded by community members.

These

and
persons have assumed a wide range of skilled and semi-skilled jobs
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have married, raised children and maintained stable and self-sufficient
homes (Cobb, 1972, p. 1).

Kennedy (1966) followed up a group of mildly and moderately
retarded individuals released from a state institution in 1948.

The

retarded were compared on a number of dimensions to a group of "normals"

who were matched on several socio-economic variables.

Eighteen years

after their release, 86 percent of the retarded and 92 percent of the

controls had married and no significant differences existed for divorce
or separation.

Both groups had the same reproduction rate and the

average IQ for the offspring of the retarded group was 99.5 as compared
to 106,6 for the "normals’'.

Both groups had the same employment rate

and were rated average by employers and both had the same frequency of

welfare support.

The retarded subjects were, of course, a select

group since they were chosen for release from the institution.

Edgerton (1967) identified 110 mildly retarded adults who were
released from a state institution between 1949 and 1958.

The object

of Edgerton’s study was to determine how well these individuals were

functioning in the community.

Edgerton (p. 142—143) found almost all

of these persons to be functioning adequately.

Only a handful had

either gotten into difficulties with the law or exhibited conspicuous
social
behavior (e.g. excessive drinking) which was in opposition to

norms.
one retarded
Coakley (1945) conducted a follow-up study of seventy
for the retarded into
individuals who were released iron an institution

the community in 1944.

had
The average number of years these persons
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been institutionalized was 6.2 with a range of 4,2 to 25.7 years.
The range of IQ's was from 40 to 75.

Coakley found that all these

individuals were able to obtain and hold jobs and no relationship

between wages and IQ scores existed.

Most of the jobs obtained were

in the unskilled category with several being semi-skilled jobs.

Although many studies have concluded that no relationship exists bet-

ween IQ and wages or ability to hold a job, it should be obvious that
if the full range of intellectual ability were sampled, some sort of

correlation would certainly be found.
Collman and Newlyn Q.956) investigated the employment histories of
two hundred mildly retarded males and females.

The histories of the

retarded persons were compared with one hundred six normal IQ individuals.

They found a positive relationship between IQ and the ability to

perform skilled work.
groups.

Sex had no effect on job success across both

Job failures x*ere negligible for both groups and when it did

occur it had the same causes regardless of which group the person was
from.

These failures were associated with unstable temperament and

inefficiency on the job.

This study brings up an interesting point.

Frequently, retarded persons have the same problems as normal individuals.

However, when these problems are exhibited by retarded persons

they are automatically associated with retardation and the response
is frequently to place these persons into institutions.

One wonders

why the retarded are not allowed to fail as other people are.
Though the studies above indicate that mildly and many moderately

retarded persons can function adequately within the community, several
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problems exist in interpreting the data.
biased.

First, all the samples are

For example, samples are frequently taken from groups that

have been released from institutions or graduated from special education
classes.

A better method for our purpose would be to randomly sample

all the retarded persons who i^ere born within a particular geographic

area ensuring that socio-economic variables are accurately represented.
Such a sampling procedure would enable us to generalize concerning
the abilities of all retarded persons with a given category.

Second,

if a representative sample could be identified, it would be interesting
to explore the ability of persons in mild and moderate categories to

manage their own lives.

Examining issues such as employment history

certainly bears on this topic but there are many normal intelligent
persons in the community who have not been able to keep a job, yet

are otherwise able to manage their lives.

Third, failure is at times

marked by return to an institution for the retarded.

As Saenger (1957)

found, such returns are precipitated by unacceptable behavior such as

property destruction.

No one has examined whether or not these persons

should return to the institution or be brought to the attention of
the criminal justice system.

What is apparent is that a person labeled

retarded is frequently placed in state schools or other institutions
nuisance or
for the retarded for behavior which can be classified as

criminal in nature.

Ironically, a person whose tested IQ is only a

very different
few points above the retarded category would receive
treatment.

mean that the
Obviously, return to an institution does not

such a mo^e is
individual is incapable of managing his life, although
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usually interpreted by society to mean just that.

Incidence

The literature which has examined the incidence of mental retard-

ation has, for the most part, concluded that approximately three percent of the population is retarded.

The President's Panel on Mental

Retardation C1962) has stated that three percent of the population
would, if tested, obtain an IQ score below 70.

Similarly, the National

Association of Social Workers (1970) has also estimated that three
percent of the population is retarded.

A number of epidemiological studies which used intelligence test
scores as the primary criterion have attempted to determine the pre-

valence of mental retardation in our society.
the results of these studies.

Table

3

summarizes

The variability of the rates found in

these studies can be explained by a number of factors.

One factor

which makes comparisons across studies difficult is the criteria used
by various authors to define retardation.

The research conducted by

the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene apparently had no

cutoff point for IQ scores and included persons that various social

service agencies ''suspected" of being mentally retarded.

definitions of mental retardation Lemkaw, Tietze,

&

In their

Cooper (1942) used

an IQ score of less than 70, Levinson (1962) considered an IQ score of

less than 75 as the criterion, and Wishik (1956) used IQ scores of
less than 80.

Another factor creating variability in these results is the age

TABLE

3

Prevalence of Mental Retardation Found by
Studies Using Intelligence as Primary Criterion
Study

Place of Study

Prevalence

Lemkau, Tietze, &
Cooper (1942)

Baltimore

1.2%

New York State
Department of Mental
Hygiene, Mental Health
Research Unit 0-965)

Onandaga County,
New York

3.5%

Wishik (1956)

Oconee and Clark
Counties, Georgia

3.7%

Levinson (1962)

Maine

3.2%
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groups surveyed in the research.

It is a well known fact that the

prevalence of mental retardation increases steadily with age
until
the mid-teens, after which it begins to decline (Conley,
1973
j.ro.s

,

p.

18 ).

is primarily due to the fact that most retarded persons
do not

get labeled as such until difficulties in school arise, and mildly

retarded persons frequently do not get identified until relatively
late in their school career.

As mentioned in a previous section,

mildly retarded persons usually blend into society and lose the label
of retardation upon leaving the educational system.

The age range

covered by these studies is as follows: New York State Department of

Mental Hygiene (1965) - one to seventeen; Lemkau, Tietze, and Cooper
(1942) — all ages; Levinson (1962 - five to twenty; Wishik (1956) -

birth to twenty.
The place where the survey was conducted also affects the results.
As demonstrated previously, race and socio-economic class affect

intelligence test scores.

It is highly unlikely that these variables

would be similar across the areas shown in Table

3.

An interesting study by Mercer (1973) hypothesized that the pre-

valence of retardation is actually one percent.

This hypothesis was

based on the belief that the double criteria recommended by the

American Association on Mental Deficiency (IQ less than 70 and significant impairment in adaptive behavior), if consistently applied, would

significantly reduce the number of persons diagnosed as retarded.

In

this study, 2,661 households were interviewed in Riverside, California

and 423 persons were identified as possibly being retarded.

These
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individuals were tested with the Stanford-Binet or
the Kuhlman-Binet
to determine IQ.

Additionally, the author conceptualized adaptive

behavior as the ability to play ever more complex roles
in a pro-

gressively widening circle of social systems with age.

She developed

a scale to measure this concept of adaptive
behavior and applied it
to the subjects, taking as a cutoff point on this scale
the lowest

three percent in each age group.

study when only one criterion

(_IQ)

IQ and adaptive behavior are used.

Table 4 shows the results of this
is used and the results when both
It is obvious from Table 4 that

the combination of IQ and adaptive behavior greatly reduces the inci-

dence of mental retardation and brings it close to a one percent rate.
This reduction is primarily due to a decrease in the number of individuals typically diagnosed as mildly retarded with some reduction

occurring in the moderately retarded group.
The information provided in this study is particularly intriguing

since most studies have indicated that the vast majority of the

retarded are in the mildly retarded group.

The New York State Depart-

ment of Mental Hygiene (1965) found that per one hundred persons, the

mildly retarded had an incidence rate of 1.07 and more severely retarded
persons had a rate of .32.

Wishik (1956) found similar results, con-

cluding that mild retardation had an incidence of 1.37 per one hundred
and more severe retardation had a rate of .59.

Mercer’s (1973) work

clearly shows that such differences are bound to occur when only IQ
is used to make a diagnosis.
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TABLE

4

Prevalence of Mental Retardation Found by Mercer (1973) in a Community
of 100 Persons When Either the Single Criterion of Intelligence Test
Score is Used on the Double Criteria of Both Intelligence Test and
Adaptive Behavior Scores
IQ

Criteria

0-19

20-49

50-69

IQ

70

.043

.571

1.529

IQ

70

.043

.543

.389

AB

3%
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Causes

Presently, over two hundred known causes of mental retardation

have been identified CConley, 1973, p. 11).

Although this figure is

large, most diagnoses cannot identify causal factors with any reasonable

degree of certainty.

The causes of mental retardation can be concept-

ualized into the following three categories; heredity; prenatal,
perinatal, and postnatal trauma; and socio-cultural factors (Farber,
1968, p. 6).

Currently, it is believed that mild mental retardation

is caused primarily by socio-cultural factors and more severe degrees

of retardation originate from the other two causal categories (Clarke
& Clarke,

1974, p. 49).

Heredity or genetic factors affect mental retardation in two ways.
First, they can lead to abnormal development of the central nervous

system or other systems which affect intelligence.

Genetic causes

have been found for Downs syndrome (Stevens, 1964, p.

phenylketonuria, a metabolic disorder (Clark

&

2)

and for

Clarke, 1974, p. 52).

Second, it is believed that the potential for intellectual development
is genetically determined.

There are numerous factors, in addition to genetics, which may

affect the developing fetus or child, including infections and intoxicants.

For example, the contraction by the mother during the first

trimester of pregnancy of German Measles, or lead poisoning, or any
all
condition causing a shortage of oxygen to the newborn child have

been shown to cause mental retardation.

Tumors can also cause retard-
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ation, and frequently retardation is caused by pathological conditions
of unknown etiology in the brain.

The largest group of mentally retarded persons, however, is composed of individuals in whom there is no indentif iable pathological
condition.

Usually classified as mildly mentally retarded, these

persons frequently come from lower socio-economic groups within society.

The exact effects of socio-cultural conditions are difficult to interpret, since they dramatically overlap with the other two causal cat-

egories.

Individuals from lower socio-economic groups receive poor

health care compared to others in society.

Undoubtedly, pregnant

women in lower socio-economic groups receive inferior prenatal care
and less adequate care during the delivery than others in society.

Young children in this group receive inferior health care of all types
(Butler & Bonnom, 1963).

Additionally, these children have a higher

incidence of malnutrition than youngsters in other socio-economic
groups.

Lilienf eld and Pasamanick (1955) have demonstrated that

mildly retarded persons may have "minimal" brain damage due to perinatal complications.

These problems can, of course, be classified

either as prenatal, perinatal, and postnatal, or as socio-cultural
in nature.

Socio-cultural factors also become confused with genetic causes.
development is related to
It can be demonstrated that intellectual

socio-economic class.

Since it is believed that intellectual potential

at least some
is genetically determined one can easily infer that

inferior intelmildly retarded persons are handicapped because of an
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lec.tual potential,

Tnere exists a body of information, however, which suggests that

socio-cultural causes other than those mentioned above are critical
in affecting mental retardation.

This literature indicates that

persons born with similar potential can develop differently.

Klineberg

C194Q) has shown that among U.S. army recruits the average IQ for

blacks was lower than for whites and additionally, blacks from the

north tended to score higher than those from the south.

It is easy

to infer that educational opportunities for southern blacks were

inferior to those available to northern blacks.

Many studies have

shown that mildly retarded persons from lower socio-economic groups
come from highly impoverished environments (McCandless, 1952, Sarason,
1953).

These environments are characterized by extreme poverty,

parental abandonment, social humiliation, rejection and defeat,
parental drunkenness, and parental indifference to the child’s
educational development.

Lantz (1954) has demonstrated that failure

experiences tend to prevent a child from taking advantage of practice
that would improve intelligence test performance.

It is likely that

life experiences characterized by failure and frustration can have

dramatic impact on intellectual development.

Kephart (1940) has

shown that the longer these mildly retarded persons spend in their

home the lower their IQ scores are apt to be.

Removal to a situation

be provided
where quality residential and educational services could

result in a reversal of this trend in IQ scores.
learning hypoMcCandles (1952, pp. 684-685) has formulated two
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theses to explain socio-cultural retardation.
i.o^

First, the environment

these individuals provides a miminum of opportunities to develop

intellectually

,

Second, the environment of these persons provides

numerous opportunities for them to learn self-defeating behaviors.
That is, they learn to expect failure and acquire a belief in their

own worthlessness.

Relation to Criminal Behavior

Although factual information concerning the relationship between

mental retardation and criminal behavior is sorely lacking (Harbach,
1976), there have, historically, been an abundance of opinions relating
the two closely.

In many cases retarded persons have not even had to

commit a criminal act to be considered criminal.

For example, the

Elizabethans regarded paupers and "wandering fools" as criminal
(Haskins & Friel, 1973, Vol. 2).

In the beginning of this century a

considerable amount of fear was generated over the threat of mental
retardation, believed to be responsible for all sorts of social

maladies.

It was in such as environment that a great number of

theories were generated regarding the criminal tendencies of the
retarded, theories which, seldom supported by facts, have fed the fears
and mistaken beliefs which surround the mentally retarded today.

According to Haskins and Friel (1973, Vol. 2), the theories concerning criminality and mental retardation can be divided into three
groups.

Religious theories were based on the concept of original sin.

Physical or genet ic

t heories

the condition of retardation.

stated that criminality was inherent in

And Environmental theories assert
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that the retarded are more susceptible to environmental hazards which

breed criminal behavior.

Henderson (1914, p. 101) and Miller (1903, p. 124) stated that
there was a universal relationship between mental retardation and

criminal behavior.
weakness.

This relationship was seen as due to sin and moral

Mental retardation was seen as divine punishment or state

of being "possessed" brought on by an "abnormal" state of the soul,

usually created by sinful behavior of the parents.
be drinking, adultery, or even evil thoughts.

These sins could

The theorists did not

consider mental retardation to be a permanent state.

Rather, it was

believed that retardation could be "cured" by moral training, hard
work, purity of thought, and forgiveness of the victim and his parents

by God (Miller, 1903, p. 139).

Those ascribing to this avenue of thought believed that mental

retardation could be erradicated through two typ£s of actions.
society must abolish its social ills.

First,

For example, the temperance

movement had its basis in this philosophical orientation.

Second, the

education of prospective parents was urged in order to educate them
regarding moral thoughts and actions.

Since "improper

thoughts and

actions could lead to a retarded child, this was seen as imperative
(Miller, 1903, p, 131),

Physical or genetic theorists believed that mental retardation
was coupled with criminal traits.

Underlying this belief was the

of
hypothesis that the retarded were less evolved than the rest

society in relation to intelligence and moral sentiments (SeQuiros,
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1907, p. 42).

Other characteristics associated with retardation

were lack of shame and purity, and impulsiveness (Lombroso,
365).

mi,

p

.

These characteristics, according to these theorists, could be

repressed by education, and a wholesome environment.

This point of

view was influenced by phrenology, which believed that human behavior
is caused by a number of separate functions or characteristics that

were more or less evolved at birth but which also could be further

developed during one's lifetime.
Persons ascribing to an environmental viewpoint held that all

persons can be effected by adverse environmental influences but the
retarded are more vulnerable.

The retarded frequently live in undesir-

able settings since they are commonly born to uninterested parents
and disordered homes (Stearns, 1931, p. 25, Goodwin, 1924, p. 13,

Cantor, 1932, p. 117).

McCord, McCord, and Zola (1959, p. 73) present

a theory which has an environmental orientation and is more pallatable

in relation to current beliefs.

That is, although the retarded have

low intelligence which can be inherited, low intelligence, in and of
itself, is not a cause of criminal behavior.

towards crime because of two factors.

The retarded may turn

First, conditions in the family

which predispose a person towards crime can affect both the retarded
and normally intelligent persons.

Second, retardation has a much

higher frequency in lower socio-economic neighborhoods which also
appear to have a higher incidence of criminal behavior.

The retarded

are affected by this environment as are other normally intelligent
people.

.
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The development of the intelligence test and its arrival in the

United States encouraged many investigators to attempt to prove that

mental retardation was indeed related to criminality.

In 1911 (Moore)

it was shown that during an eighteen month period in New Jersey,

forty six percent of all new admissions to the penal system were
retarded.

Other early studies reached the same startling conclusion.

That is, large numbers of criminals are mentally retarded (Goddard
and Hill, 1911 and Morrow and Bridgeman 1912).

Zeleny (1933), examined

one hundred sixty-three of these early studies and concluded that no
relationship between mental retardation and criminality had been
shown.

He found that not only were tests frequently given by un-

trained persons, but also that the criterion for identifying retardation

was commonly a higher IQ score than is currently recommended.
Several recent studies have supplied better information.

A research

project for the state of Kentucky (Cull, 1975), had as one of its

objectives to identify and evaluate the adult mentally retarded pop-

ulation living within correctional facilities in Kentucky.

Information

was gathered which had previously been produced by the criminal justice
system regarding more than ninety percent of the inmates in Kentucky.

Using an intelligence test score of less than 70 as the criterion,
found
(these scores were obtained from a variety of instruments) it was

retarded.
that 5.2 percent or one hundred twenty two inmates were

Out

as severely
of this sample of retarded inmates, three were classified

as mildly
retarded, twenty six as moderately retarded, and ninety three

retarded

Disabled
The Correctional Services for the Developmentallv
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(1975), using a methodology similar to Cull, found 27.5 percent of
the inmates of two correctional facilities in Illinois to be retarded.

Brown and Courtless (1958) mailed surveys to two hundred seven
correctional facilities.

Eighty four percent of these institutions

replied and supplied data regarding their inmate populations.

Using

an intelligence test score of 70 as criterion, these authors concluded
that 9.5 percent of the inmates were retarded.

The percentage of the

surveyed population which scored within the moderate retardation

range was 1.6 and several scores even placed persons in the profoundly

retarded category.

Studies examining this issue typically gather

information previously generated by penal institutions using both

unqualified persons to administer tests and intelligence tests with
suspect reliability and validity.

Haskins and Fried (1973, Vol, 4), unlike the investigators above,
attempted to establish what percentage of inmates are retarded by

having the Department of Corrections in Texas use qualified persons to

apply the Weschsler Adult Intelligence Scale, a scale widely recognized
as one of the most reliable intelligence tests available.

They found

that only five percent of this population was retarded and none of

the individuals scored below the moderate retardation level.

The

authors, however, did not conclude that retarded persons are more apt
to commit criminal acts than other persons.

They stated that their

data was affected adversely by several problems.

First, probation is

fewer marketdependant upon a steady job, and since the retarded have
they are
able skills and thus a greater tendency to be unemployed,
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denied probation more than would otherwise be warranted.

This bias

is also strengthened by the fact that fewer community agencies are

willing to serve the retarded and thus, the courts have fewer
alternatives in the case of the retarded offender.

These problems

inhibiting retarded offenders from obtaining probation lead to the

existence of a greater proportion of retarded persons being found
incarcerated at a given time than that of other offender groups.

Another issue which Haskins and Friel believe clouds their results
is the fact that the retarded, because of their lower intelligence,

are probably caught and convicted more easily than other offenders.

A number of other issues could also be contributing to the disproportionate number of retarded persons found in prisons by previous
investigators.

Earbach (1976) believes this condition exists because

retarded offenders usually receive inadequate counsel since the
client often appears to be noncommunicative and uncooperative to
lawyers, and retarded individuals on trial many times plead quilty

because of a lack of understanding regarding the legal process and
their rights and privileges.

Additionally, it should be obvious from

the descriptions provided of the various research efforts that adaptive

behavior has never been used in the assessment of inmates.

It is

likely that the incidence of retardation in prisons would be significantly reduced if both criteria were used.

The studies cited above

appear to be confounded by the variable of socio-economic level.

As

was previously shown, the reported higher incidence of retardation
intelligence
among lower socio-economic classes may be caused by biased

41

tests.

It also appears that there is a much higher
proportion of

individuals incarcerated within penal institutions who
come from
lower socio-economic groups than their numbers in
society would
indicate.

Unless studies control for the socio-economic levels of
the

samples taken, the frequency figures of retardation within
these

institutions are bound to remain inflated.

Summary and Conclusions

Mental retardation is defined as subaverage intelligence existing

concurrently with significant deficits in adaptive behavior and
originating during the first eighteen years of life.

In order to

diagnose retardation, an assessment of both intellectual ability
and adaptive behavior must be completed.

To assess intellectual

ability an intelligence test must be administered.

Intelligence

tests can classify retarded persons as mild, moderate, severe, or

profound in their intellectual deficits.

The American Association

on Mental Deficiency has recommended that the AAMD Scales be used
to evaluate adaptive behavior and, as with intelligence tests, this

instrument can classify persons as having mild, moderate, severe, or

profound behavioral deficits.
the extent of the retardation.

This classification is indicative of

Although problems exist with these

instruments, they appear to represent our best method of currently

making this diagnosis.
In making a diagnosis of mental retardation, test results indi-

cating intellectual ability and adaptive behavior must both fall
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within the retarded range.

In classifying a person regarding the

severity of retardation, the results of both tests are considered.

When both tests place the individual within the same class (e.g.
moderate), the person is classified in agreement with these test
results.

When the tests differ in their results Ce.g. the AAMD

Scale indicates moderate retardation and the intelligence test

indicates severe retardation) the highest classification is to be
used.

Although the American Association on Mental Deficiency recommends
and this work supports a dual criteria for the determination of mental

retardation, in practice this rarely occurs.

In studying the research

reports in the field of mental retardation one cannot help but be

amazed at the number of investigations that use only intelligence
test results in making diagnoses.

The practice is so common that

only rarely does one encounter the use of dual criteria.

Obviously,

this is problematic in interpreting research results.

A considerable amount of literature indicates that mildly retarded
persons can commonly live independently within a community setting.
These individuals can obtain and hold a competitive job, marry, and
buy a home.

A fair number of the moderately retarded are also

capable of the same achievements.

Although research has not been

moderately
conducted which examines the ability of the mildly and
ability
retarded person to make informed life decisions Clack of this

appears that
indicates the need for a court appointed guardian), it

retarded do have
all the mildly retarded and some of the moderately
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this capability.

This conclusion follows from the author’s personal

experience and from the research regarding the ability of the retarded
to function within community defined roles.

Although a small number

of mildly retarded persons are not able to obtain jobs and remain

employed, the reader must bear in mind that a small number of persons

who are not retarded have difficulties obtaining and keeping jobs.
This inability obviously does not mean the individual is incapable
of making informed life decisions.

Severely and profoundly retarded

persons need guardianship and other protective services as a group.

Although the incidence of retardation in the United States is
commonly held to be three percent, there is reason to believe that
this figure is inaccurate.

A great deal of variability is found

across surveys due to data-gathering techniques, reliability of
information, the intelligence test score criteria, the age group
surveyed, and the geographical area where the survey is conducted.

Additionally, Mercer’s

0 973
.

)

may be closer to one percent.

work indicates that the incidence rate
She found this by applying the dual

criteria of adaptive behavior and intellectual ability.

Though it is apparent that retarded persons are incarcerated in
significant numbers within the penal systems in the United States,
for two
the exact number of these persons has not been made clear

primary reasons.

First, problems with the studies themselves include

criteria
the unreliability of data, the inconsistent and ambiguous

given consideration
used to diagnose retardation, and the lack of any
level.
to variables such as socio-economic

Second, there are biases
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in the administration of the criminal justice sytem that lead to the

upward distortion of the number of retarded persons in prisons.

For

example, parole is more difficult for retarded persons and the capture

and conviction of these persons appears to be easier than for other

offenders.

It is apparent that the relationship between mental

retardation and criminality, if a relationship exists at all, is
not known.
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III

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (PRIOR TO M’NAGETEN)

This chapter examines the history of criminal liability before
1843.

Since the law regarding criminal responsibility in the United

States is an offspring of English law, most of the literature examined
is British.

Although numerous authors have explored this topic, only

a few have made important contributions.

The views of Brae ton,

Littleton, Fitzherbert, Coke, Hale, and Erskine (as expressed in the

Hadfield case) are of primary importance.

Other less important con-

tributors are also considered, but those mentioned above have established the foundations of Anglo-American law on criminal responsibility.
It will become apparent to the reader that these authors frequently

repeated each others ideas in their formulations.

This process of

repeating ideas continues into the present and thus, our "modem"
ideas regarding criminal responsibility can usually be traced to very
old philosophies.

Criminal Responsibility

Among ancient peoples a mental disability was regarded as something
to be feared and/or worshipped.

Mentally disabled persons were

generally thought to be possessed by spirits.

These spirits were

generally considered to be evil; to be possessed by them was fre-

quently seen, therefore, as some sort of punishment.

Exorcism, torture

treatments for this
and operations (e.g. trephining) were the standard
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condition, designed to drive out or free the
spirits.

One of the earliest references to the mentally
disabled in formal
law is found in the Twelve Tables of Rome in 449
B.C. (Brakel
1971, p. 1).

&

Rock,

These laws state, "If a person is a fool, let this

person and his goods be under the protection of his family or his
paternal relatives, if he is not under the care of anyone."

According

to Roman law, the fact that someone acted significantly
different

from other people was sufficient reason for relatives to assume

control of his possessions and person.
In the legal writings of Cicero (106-43 B.C.), mental disability
is not considered as a condition relieving one of criminal liability

(Guttmacher , 1968, p.23).

Aurelius

(A. D.

It was not until the reign of Marcus

121-180) that mental disability appears to have become

a concern in criminal matters (Biggs, 1955, p. 47).

Marcus Aurelius

is credited with making the statement that madness is its own

punishment.

There is little evidence, however, to indicate how this

attitude was manifested in criminal cases of the time.
The Mohammedan law was formed during the seventh century and contains the earliest definite provision that an unintentional killing

by a lunatic or minor was to be considered involuntary homicide
(Biggs, 1955, p. 39),

Under this law, such a finding subjected a

defendant only to make religious expiation and monetary compensation,
for which there was a fixed tariff.

The Goths conquered Rome at the end of the fifth century, soon

following with the conquest of Western Europe and Spain,

The fall of
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the Roman Empire marks the beginning of the Dark and Middle Ages,

during which periods gains made previously in defining criminal

responsibility for the mentally handicapped were lost.

Beliefs

that the mentally disabled were possessed by spirits again dominated
and such persons were frequently murdered or maimed in brutal fashion.

Prior to the beginning of the twelfth century only the criminal
act was necessary for criminal culpability to exist.

During the

twelfth century, however, the concept of mens rea or "guilty mind"
was introduced.

This concept is extremely important since it under-

lies our criminal law system and is said to justify special treatment
for the insane.

It is believed that the term comes from the ancient

maxim, "Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea."

("The act itself

does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so")
1882, p, 172).

(Bishop,

Where this maxim originated is uncertain, however,

sometime between 1100 and 1135 the concept of mens rea was applied
to the crime of perjury in English law, and thereafter the issue of

criminal intent became increasingly important in criminal matters.
Bracton, a priest and head of the highest English court, wrote the

earliest comprehensive treatment of English law in the middle of the

thirteenth century.

His writings were heavily influenced by Roman

explicators of
law, and he is viewed by many as one of the important

the legal aspects of insanity (Bowlby

&

Lloyd, 1905, p. 509).

He is

agit, et animo
credited with writing, "Furiosus non int elligit quod
- "an insane person is
et ratione caret, et non moltum distat a brutes"

lacking in mind and
one who does not know what he is doing, and is
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reason, and is not far removed from the brutes” (Bowlby &
Lloyd, 1905
p.

510).

Two concepts used in tests of criminal responsibility at

various times in the history of criminal law can be traced directly
to Bracton.

The first is the knowledge test which still has marked

impact in our legal system.

According to this test an insane person

is one who does not know the nature or the quality of the act under

consideration.

The second is the wild beast test which has been used

in the past and defines an insane person as one who does not know what

he is doing more than an infant or wild beast would.

Since insanity

was not admitted as a defense in criminal matters in England until
the fourteenth century, Bracton probably intended his formula to apply

only in civil matters.
During the reign of Edward I (1272-1307) insanity was considered
sufficient grounds for mitigation of punishment (Biggs, 1955, p. 83),
and although it did not relieve persons from criminal responsibility,

many insane individuals were pardoned after being found guilty.
Insanity began at last to be recognized as a defense during the reign
of Edward II (1307-1321).

In 1342 the statute De Prerogative Regis

was passed, (see Glueck, 1966,

p.

125 and Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905, p. 483),

referring specifically to mentally disordered individuals.

It

established the King's jurisdiction over the retarded and the insane,
retardation.
and made a distinction between insanity and mental

The

to remain
retarded were alleged to be born without reason and always

so.

seen as sick
The insane were labeled non compos mentis and were

persons who were not born that way and might recover.

Legal confusion
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over these two groups of persons existed early and is evident in this
statute, for another section of it states that a retarded person is not

necessarily so from birth and such a person may enjoy lucid intervals
CBowlby

&

Lloyd, 1905, p* 483).

It is important to note this early

difficulty, since our judicial system frequently demonstrates, even
today, confusion and lack of knowledge concerning the retarded.

During the reign of Edward III (1326-1377) an amorphous group of

persons who suffered from "complete madness" were relieved of criminal

responsibility (Brakel

&

Rock 1971, p. 376).

This represents a major

shift since it established insanity as an entrenched defense within
the English legal system,

It is, however, difficult to see how

verdicts in cases using this defense were reached, since a definition
of "complete madness" was not provided.

Sir Thomas de Littleton, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas

in 1466, directed attention towards the civil rights of the insane in
a treatise on the law of England in which he referred to persons who

were not sane as non compos mentis (unsound mind) and then explained
the civil law in relation to such persons (Bowlby

&

Lloyd, 1905, p. 512).

For example, a person was not allowed to plead insanity in civil matters

when property was involved.
in the
A mentally retarded individual was defined by Fitzherbert

twenty
early sixteenth century as a person who could neither count

he was, nor
pence, tell who his mother or father was, nor how old

detrimental
possessed any understanding of what would be beneficial or
to himself,

(Glueck, 1966, p. 129).

Fitzherbert further stated that
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if a man kncws his letters and can read then he is not a "natural fool."

Obviously, there is considerable difference between a person who

cannot count twenty pence, know his age, or know his mother or father
and a person who knows his letters and can read.

For some reason the

test requiring the ability to count twenty pence is the only test

ever mentioned in later trials.
Lord Coke, an admirer of Littleton who wrote in the seventeenth
century, did not try to identify the type or intensity of insanity
that could serve as a defense against criminal charges.

Rather, he

simply stated that criminal intent or a guilty mind (mens rea ) was
necessary.

However, he also stated that non compos mentis is not an

excuse from criminal responsibility in a case of high treason (Coke,
1836 a, p. 405).

High treason refers to attempted murder of the

sovereign, and Lord Coke felt that since such an extreme act would

with harshly.

adversly affect everyone in England, it should be dealt

This represents an exception to the requirement of guilty mind in

defining criminal responsibility.

According to Coke, "in criminal causes, as

f elony,

.

. .

the act and

wrong of a madman shall not be imputed to him... for in these causes he
is... without his mind or discretion

by his madness.

j

and... a madman is only punished

And so it is of an infant, until he be of the age

of fourteen, which in law is accounted the age of discretion."

Coke’s

was frequently
statement that "a madman is only punished by his madness"

quoted in later cases.
divided in into
Coke used non compos mentis as a generic term and
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four types;

(a)

idiots who are born with a permanent handicap render-

ing them non compos mentis

;

(b)

people who, through accident, illness,

or grief, lose their memory and understanding;

(c)

lunatics who

sometimes possess understanding and sometimes do not;

Cd)

a person

who is drunk (Coke, 1836 b, p. 247).

According to Lord Coke, no person who fits into the first two

categories could be held criminally responsible.

In the third category,

a person was exempt from criminal responsibility if, at the time of

the act, he lacked memory or understanding.

It is interesting to note

that Coke made no mention of the knowledge of right and wrong.

Instead,

Coke felt the person who was non compos mentis was incapable of criminal

intent and therefore, should be relieved of criminal responsibility.

Since the fourth type specified by coke

—a

person who is non compos

mentis is directly responsible for his own state, Coke felt that he
should not be relieved of responsibility.

Coke apparently believed

that no test for criminal responsibility was necessary.

These ideas

became part of the law of England through the Beverley case (Glueck,
1966, p. 130).

Lord Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench (1671-1676),

exerted considerable influence on later judicial opinions and made
the concept of criminal intent or guilty mind his starting point in

dealing with mental disability cases.

He was the first writer to

person
distinguish between insanity which would and would not excuse a

from criminal responsibility (Hale, 1847, pp. 29-37).

Lord Hale

defense
assumed that criminal intent was intimately related to the
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of insanity.

He attempted to deal with this problem by first categoriz-

ing the types of mental handicap and used the term
"dementia" to

refer to these.
1.

Hale identified three types of dementia:

Idiocy "...such a one is described by Fitzherber, who knows

not to tell 20’s, nor knows who is his father or mother, nor knows his

own age; but if he knows letters, or can read by the instruction of
another, then he is no idiot,.. These, though they may be evidences,

yet they are too narrow, and conclude not always, for idiocy or not is
a question of fact triable by jury, and sometimes by inspection."
It is interesting to note that this last sentence of Hale’s has been

generally ignored.

Hale appears to be saying that no single test

can adequately determine criminal responsibility, and that these tests
are merely evidences, and that it is the jury, as a fact-finding body,

which must determine whether or not a person is to be defined as an
idiot.
2.

illness.

Dementia accidentalis vel adventitia caused by an accident or
This type can further be divided into "partial insanity" and

"total insanity."

"Partial insanity" refers to persons that either

possess a competent use of reason in respect to some subjects but are
under a particular dementia in respect to other subjects, or those

whose dementia is of such a degree that it interferes little with the
use of reason.

Hale stated that partial insanity could excuse a person

from criminal responsibility but that such cases would be rare since
most persons who commie felonies are suffering from a degree of partial

insanity when they commit the offenses.

He recognized the difficulty
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in drawing the line between partial and total insanity.

ity" is defined as a total inability to reason.

"Total insan-

He proposed the

following to determine when a person is "totally insane:"

When a

person does not have "as great understanding, as ordinarily a child
of fourteen years hath," then that person can be considered totally

insane and not criminally responsible.

This follows from the fact

that at that time, in England, children under fourteen years of age

were not criminally responsible, and Hale believed that children
under fourteen could not distinguish between good and evil.

This was

the first time moral knowledge had been presented as a test for

insanity.

Again, however, the jury was left to make the ultimate

determination.
3.

Dementia affectata

— drunkenness.

Hale concluded that these

persons are criminally responsible.
In summary, although Hale seemed to say that no test can be con-

clusive, he suggested two tests himself.
z Herberts*

test for idiocy.

First, he recommended Fit-

Second, he suggested that the intelligence

of a fourteen year old child be used as criterion for discriminating

between partial and total dementia.

He implied that the ability to

discriminate between good and evil is a criterion.

Hale apparently

in itself
felt that the mere fact of mental illness was not sufficient
to relieve a person of criminal responsibility.

at Lord Onslow under
In 1724 Edward Arnold was tried for shooting

the delusion that Lord Onslow had injured him.

During the trial, Judge

ideas put forward by
Tracy* s instructions to the jury were based upon
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previous writers and contained the following:

"it is not every kind

of frantic human or something
unaccountable in a man’s actions, that

points him out to be exempted from
punishment; it must be a man that
is totally deprived of his understanding
and memory, and doth not

know what he is doing, no more than an
infant, than a brute, or a
wild beast, such a one is never the object
of punishment; therefore,
1 must leave it to your consideration, whether
the condition this man

was in, as it is represented to you on one side, or
the other, doth
shew a man who knew what he was doing, and was able to distinguish
whether he was doing tood or evil, and understood what he did"
(Weinhofen, 1954, p. 56). This is clearly a combination of Hale’s

fourteen-year-old test and Bracton’s "wild beast" theory.
Isaac Ray, writing in 1838 (1962, p. 22), described the Arnold

case as follows:
Arnold seems to have been of weak understanding from his
birth and to have led an idle, irregular, and disordered
life, sometimes unequivocally mad and at all times considered
exceedingly strange and different from other people; one
witness describing him as a strange, sullen boy at school,
such as he had never seen before. It was testified by his
family and his neighbors that for several years previous they
had considered and treated him as mad, occassionally if not
always, although so little disposed to mischief, that he was
suffered to be at large. Contrary to the wishes of his friends,
he persisted in living alone in a house destitute of the
ordinary conveniences; was in the habit of lying about in bars
and under hayricks; would curse and swear to himself for hours;
laugh and throw things about the house without any cause whatever, and was much disturbed in his sleep by fancied noises.
Among other unfounded notions, he believed that Lord Onslow,
who lived in his neighborhood, was the cause of all the tumults,
disturbances and wicked devices that happened in the country,
and his thoughts were greatly occupied with this person. He
was in the habit of declaring that Lord Onslow sent his devils
and imp.** into his room at night to disturb his rest and that
he constantly plagued and bewitched him. by getting
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into his belly or bosom, so that he could neither eat, drink,
nor sleep.,., he declared in prison it was better to die
than live so miserably and manifested no compunction for
what he had done. Under the influence of these delusions,
he shot at and wounded Lord Onslow. The proof of insanity
was strong enough, but not that degree of it which the
jury considered sufficient to save him from the gallows,
and he was accordingly sentenced to be hung.
It we carefully analyze Judge Tracy's instructions we will find that

he told the jury to use practically every test that had been proposed
up until this time.

First, he stated that persons who are not criminally

responsible do not know what they are doing.

Second, he mentioned a

total deprivation of memory and understanding.

Third, this lack of

memory and understanding had to be similar to a brute, wild beast, or
infant.

(Here, it appears that Judge Tracy saw the mind of an infant

to be similar to that of a brute or wild beast.)

Fourth, he stated

that persons relieved of responsibility must not be able to distinguish

between good and evil.

It appears that the Judge attempted to utilize

all the ideas which had been written prior to this trial.

Judge Tracy's

tendency to call upon all previous formulations may certainly be indicative of confusion over how to proceed.
The Arnold case is frequently cited as exemplifying the use of
the "wild beast test” (see Glueck, 1966, p. 139).

Why the other test

apparent
used in this case is ignored is not clear; however, it is
case, however
that once a test becomes associated strongly with a
as precedent.
erroneously, the test and the case tend to be cited

an English
The next case of importance is that of Earl Ferrer,
1760.
nobleman, tried for the murder of his steward in

The importance
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of this case stems from the directions the Solicitor-General
for the

Crown gave to the jury.

The Solicitor-General's address to the jury

summarized Hale as follows (quoted from Glueck, 1966,

•

p.

142):

...The result of the whole reasoning of this wise judge and
great lawyer (jso far as it is immediately relative to the
present and purpose) stands thus. If there be a total want
of reason, it will acquit the prisoner.
If there be a total
temporary want of it, when the offense was committed, it will
acquit the prisoner; but if there be only a partial degree
of insanity, mixed with a partial degree of reason; not a
full and complete use of reason, but (as Lord Hale carefully
and emphatically expresses himself) a competent use of it,
sufficient to have restrained those passions, which produced
the crime; if there be thought and design; and faculty to
distinguish the nature of actions; to discern the difference
between moral good and evil; then, upon the fact of the offense
proved, the judgement of the law must take place.
...The question therefore must be asked; is the noble prisoner
at the bar to be acquitted from the guilt of murder, on account
of insanity?
...Was he under the power of it, at the time of
the offense committed? Could he, did he, at the time, distinguish between good and evil? The same evidence, which
established the fact, proves, at the same time, the capacity
and intention of the noble prisoner. Did he weigh the motives?
Did he proceed with deliberation? Did he know the consequences?

The right-and-wrong test contained in the Earl Ferrer case is today
the most universally used test in American cases where the question of

insanity is raised.

Since judicial law is heavily dependent upon pre-

cedent, judges have tended to use the test uncritically and regardless
of the inconsistencies between it and the theoretical foundation for

criminal law, mens rea
knowledge.

,

which clearly involves much more than moral

The case is also notable as one of the earliest in which

a physician was called to testify as an expert witness.

Hawkins (1824, p. 1), writing in the late eighteenth century,
disobedience
stated that guilt regarding lawbreaking supposes deliberate
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to the law.

Such guilt can never be imputed to persons who are either

incapable of understanding the law or of conforming themselves to it.

Individuals who are relieved of responsibility are those who either

lack reason or are under the power of others.
Hawkins

(p*

2)

advocated as a test the ability to distinguish

between good and evil.

Infants under the age of discretion, "lunatics,"

and "idiots" were seen as unable to make this discrimination.

Hawkins

Viewed "idiots" as lacking understanding from birth and used Fitzherbert r s definition for retardation.

"Lunatics" were defined as persons

who are mad.

Hawkins obviously felt that persons using insanity as a defense

were dangerous since he advocated "strict custody in such a place
and manner as the court sees fit" in cases where a person charged

with a felony is found not guilty due
Lord Coke, Hawkins (p.

3)

to insanity.

Disagreeing with

felt that, even in cases of High Treason, a

person can be relieved of responsibility.
Hawkins* writings display confusion.

He first states that persons

who are incapable of understanding the law or of conforming to it are

relieved of responsibility and then advocates the ability to discriminate between good and evil as a test.

Obviously, knowledge concerning

law is different from moral knowledge, and the ability

to

conform to

law is not reflected in moral knowledge.
the Hadfield
In 1800 one of the most important cases occurred,

case.

test
Erskine, the defense attorney, attacked the right-and-wrong

on both medical and legal grounds.

Hadfield was a veteran of the French
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wars CGuttmacher, 1968,
brain.

p,

24) and had received a sword wound in the

He was placed on trial for attempting to shoot the King,

George III,

He believed that God was guiding him and that he had a

holy mission to sacrifice himself for the salvation of the
world.
By killing the king he believed that the state would execute
him and
therefore assist him in his martyrdom.

Erskine faced the task of defending Hadfield on the basis of
insanity with only the definitions of Coke and Hale as precedent.

He

decided to attack their definitions, and he proposed that "delusional
insanity" define criminal responsibility.

There is no record of this

argument before that time (Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905, p. 527).

Erskine’s

speech first refuted the doctrines of Coke and Hale with the following
words (Glueck, 1966, p, 144);
The Attorney-general, standing undoubtedly upon the most
revered authorities of the law, has laid it down, that to
protect a man from criminal responsibility there must be
a total deprivation of memory and understanding.
I admit
that his is the very expression used both by Lord Coke
and Lord Hale; but the true interpretation of it deserves
the utmost attention and consideration of the court. If
a total deprivation of memory was intended by these great
lawyers to be taken in the literal sense of the words:
If it was meant, that, to protect a man from punishment,
he must be in such a state of prostrated intelligence,
as not to know his name, nor his condition, nor his
relation toward others - that if a husband should not
know he was married; or, if a father, could not remember
that he had children; nor know the road to his house,
nor his property in it - then no such madness ever existed
in the world.
It is idiocy alone with places a man in
this helpless condition. .. .But in all the cases which have
filled Westminster Hall with the most complicated considerations - the lunatics and other insane persons who have
been the subjects of them, have not only had memory in my
sense of the expression - they have not only had the most
perfect knowledge and recollection of all the relations they
,
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stood in toward others, and of the acts and
circumstances
of their lives, but have, in general, been
remarkable for
subtlety and acuteness. Defects in their reasonings have
seldom been traceable - the disease consisting in the
delusive sources of thought; all their deductions within
the scope of the malady, being founded upon immoveable
assumptions of matters as realities either without any
foundation whatsoever, or so distorted and disfigured by
fancy as to be almost nearly the same thing as their
creation.
,

Instead of using the absence of intellectual faculties as the

basis of determining criminal responsibility, Erskine proposed that
the presence of delusions be used.

Erskine summarized his views as follows CGlueck, 1966,

p.

147):

Delusion, therefore, where there is no frenzy or raving
madness, is the true character of insanity .... In civil
cases... the law avoids every act of the lunatic during the
period of the lunacy; although the delusion may be extremely circumscribed; although the mind may be quite
sound in all that is not with the shades of the very
partial eclipse; and although the act to be avoided can
in no way be connected with the influence of the insanity;
- but to deliver a lunatic from responsibility to
criminal justice, above all, in a case of such atrocity as
the present, the relation between the disease and the act
should be apparent. Where the connection is doubtful,
the judgement should certainly be most indulgent, from the
great difficulty of diving into the secret sources of the
disordered mind; but still, I think, that, as a doctrine
of law, the delusion and the act should be connected.

Although the trial was far from over when Erskine delivered his
speech, the court practically ordered an acquittal of Hadfield and

the case was won.

Glueck (1925,

p.

148) has pointed out that this case is interesting

in that it sheds light on the development of law.

Erskine proposed a

definition of criminal responsibility that had no precedent in lew and
further, ran counter to definitions then in effect.

Nevertheless, it
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was accepted by the court and literally written
into law (Bowlby
Lloyd, 1905, p. 529).

&

The case contradicts the popular belief that

judicial decisions must be based upon law and precedent
and that

somehow the theory underlying the law makes all elements
consistent

with one other.
Another important case occurred when Bellingham shot and killed
the First Lord of the Treasury in 1812 (see Bowlby & Lloyd, 1905,
p,

532).

Believing that the government owed him about $500,000, he

attempted to collect it by appealing to cabinet ministers and Parliament.

Though in fact, no such claim existed against the government,

Bellingham attempted to enlist the aid of the First Lord of the
Treasury, and finding him uncooperative, shot and killed him.

Although this case is similar to Hadfield’s, the judge rejected
Erskine's position regarding criminal responsibility, and the jury

was instructed to use the right and wrong test in deciding the guilt
or innocence of Bellingham.

The interpretation of this test was

very narrow in that only if the defendant was totally deprived of the
power of reasoning could he be excused from responsibility.

Bowlby

and Lloyd 0-905, p. 532) have stated that according to the Bellingham
case "there can be no such thing as criminal insanity; the only

irresponsible man is he who has so completely lost his power of
reasoning that he is not able to entertain an intention to do anything.
In other words, an insane man becomes exempt from punishment only when

he becomes so insane as not to be able to commit an intentional act.

Since this represents a reversal of the delusion doctrine which
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relieved Hadfield of responsibility twelve years earlier, it is helpful
to understand how such decisions occur.

Glueck (1925, p. 149, footnote)

presents information which indicates that this interpretation was not
due to examination of law, knowledge concerning the insane, or a

consideration of theory, but rather was based on factors such as the
emotional reaction of the judge or those of society as a whole.

When

Bellingham committed his crime there was a great public outcry as the
First Lord was very popular.

Although it was customary to allow fif-

teen days between the date of the offense and the date of arraignment,

Bellingham was arraigned after only four days.

His counsel pleaded

for postponement saying, n I never saw the prisoner before, and it

has not been in our power to bring forth all the evidence to prove

whether he be sane or insane."

Further, in addition to the instruc-

tions above, the judge informed the jury that the people as a whole

would suffer from the victim’s untimely death and gave considerable

praise to the First Lord.

Xt appears likely that the Judge’s behavior

was directed towards obtaining a conviction.

And again, this was a

precedent setting case.
Two other trials were held in England in 1812:

Bowler’s Case (sae Biggs, 1966, p. 92).

Parker’s Case and

In those cases juries were

instructed to use both the right-and -wrong test and the delusion test.
whether
The instructions stated that "...it was for them to determine
not incapable
Che prisoner when he committed the of f ense. . .was or was
of any
of distinguishing right from wrong, or under the influence

of the
illusion which rendered his mind at the moment insensible
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nature of the act he was about to commit, since in that case he would
not be legally responsible for his conduct.”

Thus, the delusion

doctrine was again being used in English courts.
At that time in American history the courts were following the

precedents provided by English law.

worth noting.

However, two American cases are

The first is the Richard P. Clark case heard in 1816.

Clark was charged with petty larceny for stealing $7.50 worth of
property.

In its instructions the jury was told that, "...such was

the humanity of law, that no man could be held responsible for an
act committed while deprived of his reason; and that a madman was

generally considered, in law, incapable of committing a crime.

But

it is not every degree of madness or insanity, which abridges the

responsibility attached to the commission cf crime.

In that species

of madness where the prisoner has lucid intervals; if during those

intervals, and when capable of distinguishing good from evil, he

perpetuates an offense, he is responsible.

The principal subject of

inquiry, therefore, in this case, is whether the prisoner, at the time

he committed this offense, had sufficient capacity to discern good

from evil.

Should the jury believe he had such capacity, it will be

their duty to find him guilty."

The critical issue here was whether or not the accused had moral
knowledge, apparently the only question considered to be of worth.

It

was also held that mentally disabled persons who have lucid intervals
are responsible for criminal acts during those intervals.
The second case involved John Ball, tried in 1817 for arson.

He
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was known as a person frequently intoxicated and abusive
to his

children and his wife, who had been planning a separation.

With the

apparent motive of revenge expressed to a number of acquaintances
Ball set fire to his house with, his wife, family, tenants, and himself
inside.

Fortunately, the fire was quickly extinguished, and Ball

was found hiding under the bed in his room.

With a razor which was

tound near him, he had cut his throat (though not fatally).

On being

drawn out from under the bed he attempted to tear open his bleeding

wounds and shouted that "if it had been only a half hour longer,
should have had my revenge."

I

Although he was frequently intoxicated,

he was not in that state on the day of the fire and numerous witnesses

testified that the defendant was sane.

But the defense attorney took

the position that the act was so terrible that it indicated an insane

defendant.

The jury was instructed that "...if they believed the defendant,

actuated by revenge or through despair, committed this act, it would
be their duty to find him guilty.

It did not necessarily follow, as

had been contended on behalf of the defendant that the act of which

he had been charged was the result of insanity, because, from its
nature, it was horrid and unnatural.

The only question on this part

he was
of the case is, whether, at the time he committed the offense,

capable of distinguishing good from evil."

This case supported moral

knowledge as the discriminating condition and refused to accept the
"unusualness" of the act as evidence of insanity.
tinues to exist in our judicial system.

This refusal con-
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In .1831 Offord was indicted in England for shooting and killing
Cfr^-Snall

(see Biggs, 1955, p. 93).

Offord, suffering from the delusion

that the inhabitants of his town were attempting to deprive him of his

liberty and life by issuing warrants against him, carried a list
of 40 or 50 names of persons he believed were plotting against him,

Chisnall among them.

The jury was instructed that before they could

relieve Offord of responsibility they must be satisfied that "he did
not know, when he committed the act, what the effect of it, if fatal,

would be, with reference to the crime of murder.

The question was,

did he know that he was committing an offense against the laws of God
and nature?"

Obviously this test requires the jury to look at both

legal and moral knowledge.

It is interesting to note that both

Bellingham and Offord exhibited similar behaviors and the juries received similar instructions.

However, Bellingham was convicted and

executed and Offord was acquitted on the basis of insanity.

Unlike the tests mentioned above, the irresistible-impulse doctrine
originated in the United States in 1834 with the State v. Thompson
case (1834)

.

During the trial the jury was told that the defendant

between
was responsible if at the time of the act he could distinguish
the
right and wrong, was aware of the wrongfulness of the act and had

power to perform or not perform the act.

In this case the right-and-

the defendant not
wrong test was expressed somewhat differently, for

good and evil at
only was required to be able to distinguish between
itself was wrong.
the time of the act but also to know that the act

unable to control his
Further, if the defendant appeared to have been

V
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his behavior, he was not to be considered responsible.
In 1840, Oxford, who was mentally unsound, attempted to kill

Queen Victoria by firing a gun at her (see Glueck, 1925,

p.

152).

jury was instructed to relieve the defendant of responsibility"

The

if

some controlling disease was, in truth, the acting power within him,

which he could not resist.

The question is whether the prisoner was

laboring under that species of insanity which satisfies you that he

was quite unaware of the nature, character, and consequences of the
act he was committing, or, in other words, whether he was under the

influence of a diseased mind, and was really unconscious at the time

he was committing the act, that it was a crime."

This appears to ask

for knowledge concerning the physical act, morals, and law.

At

another point the jury was told that, "Upon the whole, the question will
be, whether all that has been proved about the prisoner at the bar

shows that he was insane at the time when the act was done — whether
the evidence given proves a disease in the mind as of a person quite

incapable of distinguishing right from wrong...
Several points were introduced here for the first time.

First,

the irresistible-impulse test which had appeared in American courts
is suggested by the phrase ’’which he could not resist."

Second,

the

used as a test.
nature, character, and consequences of the act" is
it is set down side
This test is used in many subsequent cases where

test (Glueck, 1925,
by side with or confused with the right-and-wrong
p.

153).

given as an
Furthermore, the right-and-wrong test was

of individuals who
illustration in this case of one possib le symptom
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should be relieved of criminal responsibility.

Summary and Conclusions

A number of conclusions are indicated by the preceding case
histories.

First, prior to 1843 much of contemporary doctrine con-

cerning criminal responsibility was formed.

The development of this

doctrine was heavily dependent on the rather arbitrary circumstances
of who happened to be writing on the subject or to occupy a particularly

Visible judicial position.

Judges chose to accept some parts of pre-

cedent-setting definitions and reject others, and the rationale

behind these decisions appears to have been at times personal and
social rather than legal, moral, and theoretical.
Second, while some efforts were made to distinguish between the

retarded and other types of offenders in defining criminal responsibility, these efforts were infrequent and sporadic.

Much of the

difficulty today in discriminating legally between the retarded and
the mentally ill has its roots in these early historic confusions.

Since mentally ill and retarded individuals have different constellthese groups
ations of problematic behavior, the inability to define
criminal
legally has undoubtedly added to the problems of defining

responsibility.
liability for
Third, this period saw a move from strict

aci_s

that certain persons
(before the twelfth century) to the recognition

are exempt from criminal responsibility.

Exceptions were defxned

theoretically, have been
by the various tests and should, at least
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based on the concept of mens rea

.

Again, writers and judges tended

to choose elements of mens rea as tests and ignore other aspects.

There is no evidence to indicate that anyone attempted to apply all
the aspects of mens rea in defining responsibility.
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CHAPTER

IV

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (FROM M'NAGHTEN TO THE PRESENT)
This chapter completes the examination of the history of criminal

responsibility, beginning in 1843 with the M’Naghten rules, the

single most influential happening in this history.

Next under

scrutiny is the irresistible- impulse rule, the product rule, the

model penal code and Vermont rule, and finally, the abolition of
the defense of insanity.

The M'Naghten Rules

In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten, laboring under the unfounded belief

that Prime Minister Robert Peel had injured him, shot and killed

Edward Drummond, mistaking him for Peel.
During M’Naghten’ s trial Q.843) the jury was instructed to

determine "...whether at the time the act in question was committed,
the prisoner had or had not the use of his understanding, so as to

know that he was doing a wrong or wicked act.

If the jurors should

be of the opinion that the prisoner was not sensible, at the time
he committed it, that he was violating the laws both of God and man,
then he would be entitled to a verdict in his favor; but if, on the
contrary, they were of the opinion that when he committed the act he

was in a sound state of mind, then their verdict must be against him."
Essentially, these instructions were the knowledge test.

The jury

was to judge whether or not M’Naghten had knowledge regarding morals
and the law of the land at the time the offense was committed.

This

,
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knowledge had to be specific to the act committed.

The jury found

M Naghten not guilty on the ground of insanity.
The verdict raised an uproar in England (see Glueck,
1966, p. 162)

since at that time attacks upon English officials had been numerous,
and unrest and violence were common.

Thus, the House of Lords was

concerned over the verdict enough to address a series of probing

questions to the judges who had tried the case.

Because of the extreme

importance of this case the questions asked and the answers supplied

by the judges are presented verbatim CM’Naghten, 1843).
Question 1 - What is the law respecting alleged crimes
committed by persons afflicted with insane delusion in
respect of one or more particular subjects or persons, as,
for instance, where, at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, the accused knew he was acting contrary to
law, but did the act complained of with a view, under the
influence of insane delusion, of redressing or revenging
some supposed grievance or injury, or of producing supposed
public benefit?
Answer 1 - Assuming that your Lordships’ inquiries are
confined to those persons who labour under such partial
delusions only, and are not in other respects insane, we
are of opinion that, notwithstanding the accused did the
act complained of with a view, under the influence of
insane delusion, of redressing or revenging some supposed
grievance or injury, or of producing some public benefit,
he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature
of the crime committed, if he knew at the time of committing
such crime that he was acting contrary to law by which
expression we understand your Lordships to mean the law of
the land.
Question 2 - What are the proper questions to be submitted to
the jury when a person afflicted with insane delusions
respecting one or more particular subjects or persons is
charged with the commission of a crime (murder for instance)
and insanity is set up as a defense?
Question 3 - In what terms ought the question to be left to
the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when
the act was committed?
Answers 2 and 3 - As these two questions appear to us to be
more conveniently answered together, we submit our opinion
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to be that the jury ought to be told in all cases that every
man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the
contrary be proved to their satisfaction. That, to establish
a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that at the time of committing that act the accused
was loboring under such a defect of reason from disease of
the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing, or did not know he was doing what was wrong.
The mode of putting the latter part of the question to the
jury on these occasions has generally been, whether the
accused at the time of doing the act knew the difference
betxjeen right and wrong; which mode, though rarely, if ever,
leading to any mistake with the jury, is not, we conceive,
so accurate when put generally and in the abstract, as
when put with reference to the party’s knowledge of right
and wrong in respect to the very act with which he is
charged.
If the question were to be put as to the knowledge
of the accused, solely and exclusively with reference to
the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury by
inducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of the
law of the land was essential in order to lead to a
conviction; whereas the law is administered on the principle
that every one must be taken conclusively to know it withIf the accused was conout proof that he does know it.
scious that the act was one which he ought not to do, and
if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of
the land, he is punishable, and the usual course therefore
has been to leave the question to the jury, whether the
accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know he was
doing an act that was wrong; and this course we think is
correct, accompanied with such observations and corrections
as the circumstances of each particular case may require.
Question 4 - If a person under an insane delusion as to
existing facts commits an offence in consequence thereof, is
he thereby excused?
Answer 4 - The answer must of course depend on the nature
did
of the delusion; but making the same assumption as we
delusion
partial
such
under
labours
he
that
before, namely,
only, and is not in other respects insane, we think he
must be considered in the same situation as to responsibility
exist
as if the facts with respect to which the delusions
dehis
of
influence
the
were real. For example, if under
attempting
of
act
the
lusion he supposes another man to be in
as he supposes
to take away his life, and ha kills that man,
If his
punishment.
in self-defence, he would be exempt from
serious injury
delusion was that the deceased had inflicted a
him in revenge
to his character and fortune, and he killed
to punishment.
for such supposed injury, he would be liable
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Question 5 - Can a medical man conversant with the disease
of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the
trial, but who was present during the whole trial and the
examination of all witnesses, be asked his opinion as to
the state of the prisoners' mind at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was
conscious at the time of doing the act that he was acting
contrary to law, or whether he was laboring under any and
what delusion at the time?
Answer 5 - In answer thereto, we state to your Lordships,
that we think the medical man, under the circumstances
supposed, cannot in strictness be asked his opinion in the
terms above stated, because each of those questions involves
the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to,
which it is for the jury to decide, and the questions are
not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case
such evidence is admissible. But where the facts are
admitted or not disputed, and the question becomes
substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to
allow the question to be put in that general form, though
the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right.

These answers emphasized a number of points.

First, to be

criminally responsible, a person must know the nature and quality of
an act when the act is performed.

However, exactly what is meant

by the "nature and quality" is not clear.

Second, a person must

have knowledge of right and wrong concerning an act at the relevant
time.

This knowledge refers to both legal and moral knowledge.

Since

asked to
the judges indicated that, in general, juries should be
of right and
decide criminal responsibility on the basis of knowledge

unimportant and the M Naghten
wrong, the first point becomes relatively

knowledge test.
rules are simply a restatement of the

Third, only

regarding criminal responjuries have the right to make decisions
as expert witnesses
sibility, and physicians are firmly established

defendant is in question.
in trials where the sanity of the

72

These answers have become a part of the fabric
of American law.

Before looking at their expression in American law we
will examine
the criticisms which the M'Naghten rules have raised,
criticisms

primarily concerned with the result of the application of these
rules.

That is, how do these rules affect the decisions which juries

iaake and

how well do these effects fit with a particular critic's

ideas concerning justice.

Since the answers which defined criminal irresponsibility were

responses to questions concerning persons who were suffering from
insane delusions, it is apparent that the M'Naghten rules were

formulated for individuals who are considered mentally ill and not
for the mentally retarded.

Furthermore, because the questions and

answers focus on persons suffering from delusions, they do not
address other behaviors associated with mental illness.

Therefore, it

is likely that the judges never intended that these rules apply to

all cases where criminal responsibility is in question.

It should

be kept in mind that these judges were under considerable pressure to

explain their actions to persons who believed that a miscarriage
of justice had occurred.

The stress they felt is apparent in the

judge's expressed regret that the questions were not argued by counsel

rather than being answered by them (M'Naghten, 1843).

Obviously,

the judges were uncomfortable with their position and would naturally

have preferred not to have been required to justify their decisions
in court.

The answers supplied are merely a conglomeration of previous

ideas, offering little or nothing which extends or improves upon

,
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these ideas.

The M’Naghten rules have been severely criticized by numerous

authors (e.g. Bowlby

&

Lloyd, 1905 p. 544

Fitzgerald, 1962, p. 153).

;

Hall, 1960, p. 519;

Sir James Stephen (1883) writing forty

years after the case, voiced criticisms of M’Naghten which are

frequently echoed today.

According to Sir Stephen, (Vol. II,

154)

p.

a judge himself, the answers provided by the M’Naghten case do not

deal with many of the issues involved and in fact tend to confuse
juries.

Further, Stephen states that the M’Naghten rules were never

meant for general adoption by courts and in fact, the answers given

were designed primarily with an interest in justifying the behavior
of the judges in the M’Naghten case (see Biggs, 1955, p. 108).

In

addition, it is apparent from the statement at the end of the third
answer, ’’...and this course we think is correct, accompanied with

such observations and corrections as the circumstances of each
particular case may require," that the judges did not mean these
rules to apply to all circumstances.

Another criticism leveled by Stephen

(p.

155) is that according

ignorance
to M’Naghten isanity is regarded simply as a case of innocent

have
or mistake, failing to recognize the effects this condition can

on the emotions and will.

one form or another.

This criticism has been much voiced, in

Fitzgerald (1962, p. 135) criticized M’Naghten

of emotion.
for the emphasis on reason and the entire disregard

Biggs

misleading since it examines
(1955, p. 109) feels that M’Naghten is
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only one variable in determining criminal responsibility.

It is

interesting to note, however, that although many individuals have
iticiz,ed these rules,

the literature of law contains almost no

discussions of the problems which M’Naghten created by making no

distinction between mental illness and mental retardation.

While Stephen

(p.

154) has serious questions regarding the M’Naghten

Rules, he nevertheless recommends the judges follow these rules until

...some more binding authority is provided, especially as the practice

has now obtained since 1843.”

Stephen, as a prominent judge, obviously

was in a position to affect England’s laws regarding insanity and yet
he refused to take the initiative, preferring to rely on precedent.

This behavior exemplifies what seems to me to be a major problem with

criminal law in general.

That is because judges are expected to rely

on precedent, they avoid initiating significant changes even when they
believe that justice would be better served by the change.

While

stability is certainly necessary in law, this over-strong emphasis on
precedent makes any change very difficult to achieve.
The M’Naghten rules appear to be based upon phrenological concepts.
That is, each function is considered to be directed by a different

faculty of the brain.

Within this theoretical framework it is very

possible for the moral faculty to be affected by insanity while the
conative— emotional aspects of the individual remain 'normal.
Another frequently named objection to M’Naghten is that because
of its subjectivity, it is extremely difficult for juries to interpret

(see Eowlby & lloyd, 1905, p. 550).

These critics demand a more
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objective "yardstick" approach for objectively measuring a defendant’s
responsibility.

Such criticism appears to me to have little value

since such decisions are by their very nature subjective.

The pri-

mary need is for legal definitions and tests which enable society to
recognise the intent of the criminal law and increase its ability to
identify those who should not be held responsible.

In the final

analysis, providing such a framework upon which to base subjective

judgements must create a greater hope for just and rational findings.
Since the H’Naghten rules were created they have found expression
i.n

the American judicial system in numerous ways.

Why English legal

decisions in 1843 should have determined American judicial decisions
on the issue today is explained solely by the fact that Anglo-American

courts traditionally have had difficulty with this topic, and most
states have followed British law rather than grapple with the problem
themselves.

Once the H’Naghten rules were applied in America, judges

tended to view it as precedent and, as previously stated, extremely

difficult to change.

Though the H’Naghten rules were imported by the United States, they
were net always accepted in their totality.

Two early cases (State v.

Spencer, 1846 and Geaz v. State, 1896) held that the only true test
he was
for insanity is whether or not the defendant realized that

morally wrong at the time the act was committed.

were allowed by these courts.

No other criteria

In both Commonwealth v. Freth (1853)

were told that in order
and Commonwealth v. Heidler (1899), the juries
must believe
to find the defendant not guilty due to insanity they

capable of dis~
that the offender, at the time of the act, was not

76

tinguishing between right and wrong.

Additionally, if the defendant

was suffering from delusions, he would be excused if the
mistaken

beliefs would have served as a defense if they had in fact been
correct.
v. State

Bolling v. State 0-891), State v. English 0913), and Bell

0915) held that

if, at the time of the act, the defendant

was suffering from a disease of the mind such that he did not know
the nature and quality of the act he was committing or did not know

he was doing wrong then he would be relieved of criminal responsibility.
Scate v. Dues trow, 0897) defined insanity as the inability

to dis-

tinguish between right and wrong in reference to the act in question,
and, also, the inability to comprehend the character and nature of

the act.

In People v. Schmidt 0915) the judge took great pains to

define the word "wrong.”

Knowledge of law was not held to be a deciding

factor in criminal responsibility.

To be relieved of responsibility,

the offender must lack moral knowledge.

Simply having a moral view at

variance with those that find expression in the law is not enough;
rather, this variance must have originated from a disease of the mind.

When mentally retarded persons have been brought into court on
criminal charges, judges have defined insanity in similar fashions.

Courts have typically looked upon knowledge of right and wrong as the

deciding factor (see State v. Saxon, 1913 and Wartana v. State, 1885).
In an unusual case (State v . Richard, 1894), the judge, when instructing

the jury, stated that the evidence was sufficient to indicate that the

defendant had committed the act.

The question was whether or not the

prisoner had the mental capacity for criminal intent.

Realizing that
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knowledge of right and wrong and consequences and effects is a matter
of degree, the judge utilized a formula proposed by Lord Hale.

He

instructed the jury to reach a verdict of not guilty due to insanity
if*

in the jury's opinion, the defendant had a mental capacity less

than the average fourteen year old child.

It is interesting to note

that evidence regarding IQ testing was frequently not admitted in

these early cases.
In concluding this section, it must be made clear that the M’Naghten

rules were designed to assist courts in making decisions regarding

criminal responsibility when confronted with mentally ill defendants
who were suffering from delusions.

The M’Naghten court made no

attempt to distinguish between different types of mental conditions

which might affect criminal responsibility decisions.

The retarded

person is placed in a particular disadvantageous position when the

M’Naghten rules are applied, for while he may recognize that

a parti-

cular act is wrong, he may not be able to fully comprehend the serious-

ness or consequences of the act.
The idea behind M’Naghten, that a person cannot be guilty of a

crime without criminal intent Cor mens rea ) is basically sound.

For

example, a man who suffers a stroke while driving a car and kills a

pedestrian is not guilty of a crime.

However, if the driver inten-

tionally hits a person then a crime has been committed.
The implementation and results of M’Naghten, however, present a

number of problems.

First, M’Naghten tends to confuse issues such as

ability to distinguish between right and wrong.

It is doubtful that
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anyone can be totally unable to make that distinction,
and yet this is

what M'Naghten apparently seeks.

Second, while varying degrees Of

mental illness are recognized in contemporary thought, partial
insanity as conceptualized in this history is not accepted today as
a valid type of mental disorder.

Third, although probably these

rules were never meant to apply to all types of defendants and situations, they have been applied as if they were.

Fourth, there is

considerable difficulty in applying these rules through juries in
courts.

Fifth, numerous critics believe that these rules do not

remove criminal responsibility from many persons who should be so
relieved.

Sixth, these rules specify as a criterion lack of knowledge

concerning law.

As is commonly known, ignorance of the law has

never been an accepted defense in Anglo-American courts and its in-

clusion in these rules has tended to be confusing.

Seventh, the

judges generated considerable confusion by including knowledge of the

nature and quality of the act as one of the tests and at the same
tine failing to define nature and quality.

Eighth, medical persons

were established as expert witnesses in these cases, but the sole use
of a physician in making a diagnosis in all cases creates a problem

in itself.

In addition, courts have relied on physicians to answer

questions regarding these tests such as knowledge of right and wrong.

Certainly physicians are no more qualified to answer these questions
than other persons and, at times, may be less able to give an accurate
answer.

And last, the judges formulated these rules in an attempt to

postestablish justice for insane offenders without reference to the
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acquittal issue.
confinement.

M’Naghten, in fact, spent the rest of his life in

This case provided a model for other courts, and up

until recently it has been common practice for individuals
acquitted
for even minor charges to be kept in institutions for
life.

The Irresistible - Impulse Test

The irresistible- impulse test is never the sole test of criminal

responsibility but in at least fifteen states it is used in conjunction
with, the M'Naghten right-and -wrong test
p.

(see Brakel & Rock, 1971,

380).
It has long been a tradition in Anglo-American law that persons

who have no control over their behavior are not responsible for their
actions.

For example, if a person, under threat of death, is coerced

into committing a robbery, he is not criminally liable.

With the

irresistible- impulse test, however, it is not clear that the behavior
is irresistible since the elements which make the behavior irresistible

cannot be observed.

The assumption in this test is that sanity is

associated with the ability to resist impulses while insanity is

associated with opposing conditions.

where

th.e

The test is relevant in cases

offender knows the quality and nature of the act and can

also distinguish between right and wrong but is not able to resist

committing a criminal act because of an overpowering impulse originating
from mental disability.

The test is believed to take into account tne

conative— emotional aspects of an individuals personality.
stating
The test has received a considerable amount o£ criticism

.
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that the only proof of irresistible- impulse is the actual occurrence
of the act.

The question is, whether or not it is possible to dis-

tinguish an unresisted impulse from an irresistible impulse associated

with insanity.

Clearly juries are responsible for deciding whether

or not the offender's mental condition rendered him unable to resist

committing the criminal act.

Additionally, they must decide whether

or not an inability to resist committing an act originated from mental

illness.

The irresistible-impulse test is American in origin and was first

expressed in Ohio in 1834 in State v. Thompson.

The judge in that

trial instructed the jury to reach a verdict of not guilty if the

defendant was unable to either discriminate between right and wrong
or was unable to resist the act.

wealth

v.

In 1844 Chief Justice Shaw (Common-

Rogers) instructed the jury to use the M'Naghten rules in

deciding criminal responsibility and additionally "...if the disease
existed to such a degree that for the time being it overwhelmed the
reason, conscience, and judgement, and whether the prisoner, in

committing the homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse.

If so,

then the act was not the act of a voluntary agent,

but the involuntary act of the body, without the concurrence of a mind

directing it,"
In a frequently quoted case (Commonwealth v. Mosler,

186*4)

in using
Chief Justice Gibson appeared to recognize the difficulties

clearly defined
this test and attempted to give the jury cautious and
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instructions.

The Chief Justice told the jury that the defendant

would be relieved of responsibility only when his perception of right
and wrong was totally absent.

In further instructions the justice

defined "moral" or "homicidal insanity" as "...consisting of an

irresistible impulse to kill, or to commit some other particular
offence.

There may be an unseen ligament pressing on the mind,

drawing it to consequences which, it sees, but cannot avoid, and
placing it under a coercion, which, while its results are clearly
perceived, is incapable of resistance.

The doctrine which acknowledges

this mania is dangerous in its relations, and can be recognized only
in the clearest cases.

It ought to be shown to have been habitual,

or at least to have evinced itself in more than a single instance.

It

is seldom directed against a particular individual, but that it may

be is proved by the case of the young woman who was deluded by an
irresistible impulse to destroy her child, though aware of the heinous

nature of the act.

The frequency of this constitutional malady is

fortunately small, and it is better to confine it within the strictest
limits.

If juries were to allow it as a general motive, operating in

cases of this character, its recognition would destroy social order
To estahlish. it as a justification in

as well as personal safety.

any particular case, it

is,

necessary either to show, by clear proofs,

oc the
its contemporaneous existence evinced by present circumstances,

existence of an habitual tendency developed in previous cases, becoming
in itself a second nature."
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Numerous other states adopted irresistible- impulse as a defense
(see State, v. Felter, 1868; Blackburn v. State, 1872; Hays v. Common-

wealth, 1896; State v. Clancy, 1915; Clark v. State, 1843).

All of

the courts permitting irresistible- impulse as a defense hold that the

impulse must be the product of mental disability.

An irresistible

impulse cannot be the uncontrolled passion of a "sane” person.

There are a number of problems with this test.

First, as with the

M’Naghten rules, it is primarily concerned with mental illness and
does not focus on the mentally retarded.

Second, this test in action

has proven to be difficult for juries due to the fact that, as pre-

viously mentioned, this judgement cannot be made through observation.
Rather, juries must examine both the behavior of the defendant and
the testimony of psychiatrists in order to make the inferential leap

this test requires.

The Product Rule

In 1871 the New Hampshire Supreme Court discarded the M’Naghten

rules as inadequate and established what was later to be labeled the

product rule (State

y

Jones, 1871).

The product rule, as stated in

for an
this case, held that no man shall be criminally responsible

diseases.
act which is the "offspring and product of mental

In its

that in most cases
criticism of the M’Naghten rules the court stated
the mind... it has
where it is apparent that "disease has attacked

and mental power,
not wholly obliterated the will, the conscience,

some degree of ability
but has left its victim still in possession of
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in some or all of these qualities."

This decision actually came out

of a minority opinion voiced by Judge Doe in an earlier
New Hampshire

case (State v. Pike, 1869).

New Hampshire was alone in using this rule until 1954 (Durham
V. U.S.) when it was adopted in its essence by the Federal Courts of

Washington D.C.

In this case, if the defendant's act was the product

of a mental disease or defect he was not cr imin ally liable.

In

attempting to clarify this rule, "disease" was defined as a condition
'’which is considered capable of either improving or deteriorating"

and "defect" was defined as a condition which would not either improve
or deteriorate and which could either be cogenital, the result of

injury, or the residual effect of mental or physical disease.

In Durham v. U.S., Judge Bazelon criticized M’Naghten as concerning

itself only with the cognitive aspect of man’s functioning.

Bazelon

stated that the problem was not that the right and wrong test rests

upon an inadequate, invalid, or indeterminate sympton or manifestation
but rather, that it rests upon any particular symptom.

This case

additionally held that all relevant professional disciplines could
testify in court.
The product rule was refined by two later cases in Washington, D.C.
First, McDonald v, U.S.

(1962) further defined "disease" or delect"

mental or
as any abnormal condition of the mind substantially affecting

emotional processes and substantially impairing behavior controls.
Second, Washington v, U.S.
in court.

(1967) clarified the role of the psychiatrist

Psychiatrists were prohibited from testifying as to whether
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or not the criminal act was the product of a mental disease or defect.

This question was to be answered only by the jury.

Psychiatric wit-

nesses, however, could testify on how the disease or defect related
to the development, adaptation, and functioning of the defendant’s

behavioral processes.

In 1972, the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia rejected the product rule and adopted

the Model Penal Code rule (United States v. Brawner)

.

This change

occurred primarily from the unfounded belief that the Durham decision

would release a large number of potentially harmful individuals
(Gasch, 1959).

The Product Rule has not been widely accepted and, as a matter of
fact, only two other jurisdictions, Maine and the Virgin Islands,

have adopted it.

Obviously, the Product Rule does not include the

concept of insanity.

Whether or not the definitions of mental

disease and defect are an improvement is debatable.
tests, the jury has two tasks.

As with other

It must first decide whether or not

the defendant has a relevant mental condition.

Second, if the accused

does have a relevant mental condition, the jury must determine

whether or not the act was a product of that condition.

Apparently

there was an attempt to include mental retardation as a relevant

condition under the label of defect.

But this definition leaves so

to assist
much to be desired that its use will probably do very little

juries in making these decisions.

A second criticism involves the concept of product.

The product

making this
rule calls for juries to make a causal connection, and
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connection is a formidable task.

Critics arguing the above two

points assert that M’Naghten was superior since it defined criminal

responsibility in more definite terms (see Sobeloff, 1958 and Guttmacher, 1968, p, 34).

The New Hampshire and District of Columbia

decisions deliberately built in ambiguity, since these courts felt
that replacing one set of theories with another would lead to problems,

the generation of new knowledge possibly making any well-defined rule

outdated.

Though this may indeed occur the wisdom of refusing to

use all available current knowledge is dubious.

The issue seems to

revolve around the need to recognize when current conceptions are
clearly outdated and to take appropriate corrective action.

A third criticism is that the ambiguities involved in the product
rule enable many persons who ought to be punished to escape justice
and thereby allow these individuals to continue to present a threat
to society.

Whether or not this criticism is borne out by fact is

still unclear, since relevant research has yet to be conducted.

It

is clear, however, that society reacts with fear to persons who have

committed offenses and suffer from mental disabilities.

The District

of Columbia, soon after the Durham decision, enacted legislation

which mandated institutionalization for individuals found not guilty
by reason of mental disability in their courts.

The implications of

explored in more
this type of action are very negative and will be

detail in a later chapter.
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The Model Penal Code Standard and Vermont Rule

The Vermont legislature, in 1959, (Vermont Statutes Annotated,
4801) enacted a law which essentially rejected the M T Naghten Rules

and instituted instead a rule almost identical to that proposed in

the Model Penal Code (American Law Institute, 1962, p. 66).

The

Vermont law states "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or

defect he lacks adequate capacity either to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law.

1

'

In

attempting to clarify "disease” and "defect” the law further states
that these terms do not include any abnormality manifested only by

repeated criminal or antisocial conduct but that they do include
congenital and traumatic mental conditions as well as disease.
The Model Penal Code differs from the Vermont law only in two
respects.

First, it substitutes the word "substantial" for "adequate."

Whether or not this difference has any impact on jury behavior is
unknown, but it is reasonable to assume that it does not.

Second, the

code includes "(wrongfulness)” after the word criminality and thus

clearly indicates that appreciation of morality is important.
at
This formulation has been adopted by at least ten states and

Shapiro, 1967;
least eight of the eleven federal circuits (see U.S. v.

U.S, v. Freeman, 1966; and Wion v. U.S., 1963).

more than a
This test for criminal responsibility is nothing
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broadening of the M’ Naghten and irresistible-impulse rules.

The

broadening is accomplished by requiring only a substantial impairment
of capacity rather than total impairment.

Since one of the criticisms

of M Naghten is its all or none quality, this represents
an improvement.

A number of criticisms have been leveled at this formulation (see
Brakel & Rock, 1971,

p.

385; Hall, 1957 and Roche, 1958, p. 180).

First, the phrase "result of" creates the same problems associated with

causality in the product rule.

Second, the Vermont wording can be

interpreted to exclude moral knowledge and to require only that the

defendant have legal knowledge.

As mentioned in relation to M'Naghten,

the requirement of legal knowledge is problematic.

appears to be too much reliance upon cognition.

Third, there

Fourth, while it

appears that Vermont includes the mentally retarded in their test,
it is not clear that the American Law Institute does likewise.

the definitions of disease and defect are ambiguous.

Fifth,

In general,

many of the same criticisms levelled at M Naghten can be brought to
T

bear against the Vermont or Model Penal Code tests.

Abolition of the Insanity Defense

A number of authors have suggested that the insanity defense should
be abolished.

These writers can be divided into two camps.

group (e.g. Menninger, 1968; Wooton, 1963; and Alexander

The first

& Staub,

1927)

maintains that psychiatry is an important element in all criminal
proceedings.

When a defendant is before the court, the issue is never

whether or not the accused is insane.

Rather, if the defendant

8B

committed the act in question, the question is what type(s)
of treat-

ment can be offered to ensure the rehabilitation of the offender.

According to this theory, the psychiatrist plays a dominant role
in
diagnosis and the prescription of treatment.
This philosophy views criminal behavior as indicative of an

illness (Menninger, p. 254, Wooton, p. 76), and maintains that when
an illness has been identified, treatment should be applied.

The

object of treatment is to protect the community from a repetition of
the offense in the most economical method possible.

Menninger (p. 263)

states that, at least for the present, this treatment must occur within
prisons, since mental hospitals cannot provide the security which

most of these people require.

However, he expects that if his plan

is implemented, mental hospitals would soon provide the bulk of these

services.

A major problem with this formulation

is the belief that psychiatry

can effectively change criminal behavior and that mental hospitals

represent treatment (a full discussion of this issue will be contained
in a later chapter).

In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that

psychiatric techniques can effect these changes and further, it is
common knowledge that mental hospitals are frequently little more
than prisons themselves,

Menninger ’s expressed faith

(p.

263) in the

treatment value of mental hospitals is difficult to understand.
This philosophy advocates that psychiatrists not only determine

when it is safe to release a convicted person, but also, that they
those, offenders
should determine when treatment is impossible and detain
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indefinitely.

Giving psychiatrists this extremely broad authority

would likely threaten the security and freedom of all people in our
society.

Even if society were willing to trust psychiatrists with

its freedom, the differences which exist between these professionals
as evidenced by the battle of the experts phenomenon in courts makes

this recommendation utterly unworkable.

The second group of writers (e.g. Szasz, 1963 and Morris, 1976)
suggest that psychiatrists should be kept completely out of the

criminal justice system.

These authors feel that the intrusion of

psychiatry has led to the neglect of the civil liberties of offenders
(Szasz, p. 103),

Violations of civil liberties have indeed occurred

when persons relieved of criminal responsibility have been placed
in mental hospitals.

Psychiatric involvement is seen as an in-

appropriate intrusion into a criminal justice system which should

aim at identifying and penalizing offenders.

According to Morris,

the mentally disabled defendant should be granted the same rights
as are guaranteed to all offenders under the constitution.

The basic questions asked by this philosophy are as follows (Brakel
6 Rock,
1.

1971, p. 378);

Should the criminal justice system make a distinction between

offenders who should be treated and those who should be punished?
2.

resemblance
Do penal and mental health institutions bear any

to punishment and treatment, respectively?
3.

workable?
Is the defense of insanity in any formulation

4.

criminal
What is the value of psychiatric testimony in
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proceedings?
The elimination of the insanity defense appears to be unconstitutional.

The attempts of Washington, Mississippi, and Louisiana

to abolish this defense all were found to be unconstitutional in

three separate cases (State v. Strasberg, 1910; Sinclair v. State,
1931; and State v. Lange, 1929).
It appears that insanity will continue to be a valid defense

since its elimination has received no support within our judicial
system.

The questions, however, which are raised by this viewpoint

are important and should be addressed.

The first question asks

whether or not courts should identify some offenders as being not
responsible for their behavior and thus, recommend treatment rather
than punishment.

Certainly, in our society there are persons with

such severe mental deficits (e.g. a profoundly retarded person)
that they are denied many of their civil rights.

Since society believes

that these persons are incapable of caring for themselves and making

informed decisions, it is a travesty of justice to hold them responsible
for any behavior classified as criminal.

The punishment versus

treatment issue is complex, and will, therefore, be explored in

depth in a later chapter.
The second question posed is whether or not mental hospitals and

prisons represent treatment and punishment respectively.

As mentioned

better than jails
previously, mental hospitals are all too often little

frequently is accidental.
and any resemblance to a treatment facility
formulation oC the
The third question asks whether or not any
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insanity defense is workable.

Such a question ignores the fact that

any process designed to identify those guilty of offenses
is faulty.
That is, with all the safeguards built into the American
system, it
is not unusual for persons to be wrongly convicted.

What is at issue

is not to find a perfect way of distinguishing between
responsible

and irresponsible defendants but, rather, to discover how to best

use current knowledge to accurately identify these persons and, at
the same time, to preserve societal interests.
In the last question, the value of psychiatric testimony is

questioned.

Indeed, this author believes that the value of psychiatric

testimony as it has been used in the past is indeed dubious.

The

exclusivity of psychiatric testimony when gathering evidence on
criminal responsibility has certainly presented a problem.

Since

insanity is a legal rather than a medical term, it is difficult to
see why others would not testify.

Psychiatrists are not trained to

answer questions related to a person’s capability for moral knowledge.

Certainly psychiatrists are no more qualified than anyone else to
answer these types of questions.

Summary and Conclusions

Insanity as a defense was first recognized in English courts during
the reign of Edward II (1307-1321) and became entrenched in law under
the sovereignty of Edward III (1326-1377).

The test used to determine

criminal irresponsibility in most cases has been whether or not the
defendant had knowledge that the alleged act was wrong when it was
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committed.

We haye seen that this knowledge test originated in the

writings of Bracton during the thirteenth century.

The K’Naghten case

of 1843 firmly established the test in both the English and American

judicial systems.
The M r Naghten rules have been criticized almost from the time of

conception and therefore, alternative rules have been established
in the United States.

The irresistible- impulse test, first formulated

in the United States and often used in conjunction with the knowledge

test, excuses persons from criminal responsibility when they are

unable to control their behavior because of mental illness.

Another

test established in the United States is the product rule, which

declares that if the criminal act is a product of mental disease then
the defendant is not criminally responsible.

The Model Penal Code

standards and Vermont rule were also formulated in the United States
and are little more than a restatement of the knowledge and irresistible-

impulse tests.

Attacks on and criticisms of these tests continue today.

It is

easy to conclude that our difficulties with criminal responsibility
are rooted in the past.

Many of the ideas generated in the past and

of who
used at later dates were results of the arbitrary circumstances

clear
happened to be writing about legal insanity rather than of a

mental conditions,
analysis of contemporary knowledge concerning relevant

societal outcomes desired, and mens rea.

It is likely that a number

of factors have contributed to this situation.

First, judges

ar^.

exists, there is a
expected to rely on precedent, once a precedent
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tendency to follow rather than change it.

Second, when ideas regarding

criminal responsibility were first being formulated, knowledge

regarding relevant mental conditions was considerably less than it
is now.

Even today our understanding of these conditions is limited.

In the past, judges apparently felt compelled to follow the advice
of almost anyone who claimed to be an authority.

And again, once

precedent is set, judges tend to use it as the rationale behind later
decisions.

Third, persons who can successfully be defended on the

grounds of insanity are characterized by many as socially deviant.

Most persons react towards these deviant individuals with fear.

Any

judge or legislature attempting to liberalize criminal responsibility
tests is bound to incur the wrath of the public, as evidenced by public

reaction following the M’Naghten case.

Even when the Durham decision

was reached, a considerable amount of criticism came from the press,
and soon after, the legislature passed a law mandating institution-

alization of persons in Washington D.C. found not guilty by reason of
insanity.
If one examines the arguments contained in this literature, it

appears that the major question is where society is to draw the

line between those who are to be held responsible for criminal acts
and those who are not.

The author included Figure

1 as a

useful tool

in this analysis.

Within Figure

1,

mental condition represents an abstract variable

of responsibility.
which in one of its extremes can relieve a defendant

mental health such that
For example, it can represent intelligence or

9 '(

society

within

insanity

of

incidence

the

illustrating

curve

Thaoretical

1.

Fig.

,
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bhe right side of the distribution, is the more healthy or intelligent

portion of the population.

Point A represents that point along the

continuum where we separate those individuals who are responsible
for their actions from those who are not.

Since persons who are not

responsible are located to the left of A, the ability of persons
relieved of responsibility increases and the number of persons so
relieved increases as A moves to the right.

Since there is no

absolute way to determine where point A is placed, its location is
dependent upon each person r s ideas concerning how justice would bast

be served.

This, of course, involves subjective judgement.

Figure 2 is included to further illustrate this point.

quadrants

ca,n

The

be conceptualized as containing frequency counts.

This

figure shows how individuals perceive cases where insanity is used as

When justice is served, an entry is made in the upper left

a defense.

quadrant

(

x ) or lower right quadrant (x)

.

Such entries indicate

that the court and the perceiver place point A in Fig.

place.

In such cases, critics do not appear.

are made in other quadrants, criticism arises.
quadrant

(y)

1 at the same

However, when entries
In the upper right

the perceiver believes the accused to be insane but the

court finds him to be sane.

In this case the perceiver would criticize

the test used by the court as too restrictive.

Only when the court

moved point A in Fig. 1 further to the right would this critic be
satisfied.

In the lower left quadrant (z)

the perceiver believes

insane.
the defendant is sane and the court finds him to be

Here

cri-Licisn
the perceiver sees the court as too lenient, and again,

Court finding
of insanity

Defendant
perceived by
outsider as
insane

Defendant
perceived by
outsider as
sane

X

Court finding
of sanity

y

z

Fig. 2, Individual perceptions of justice in cases where the
defense is insanity.
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would occur.

In this case however, there is not a concern for the

well-being of the defendant.

Instead, fear probably occurs with the

belief that deviant persons who represent a threat to society are

being placed back on the streets.

Only when the court’s test moved

point A in Fig, 1 to the left would this critic be satisfied.
Of course, these examples are extremely simplified but they do

serve a purpose.

The figures demonstrate that two distinct subjective

judgements frequently are made by critics.

A in Fig,

1 is a

subjective judgement.

First, where to place point

Second, whether or not a

given defendant is significantly affected by a relevant mental condition
is a subjective judgement.

This author believes that decision rules

which more clearly show where the courts consider point A to be and
more clearly indicate when incapacitating mental conditions exist
would help to decrease the variability among the judgements made by
various jurors.

Interestingly, courts have refused to use current

knowledge in framing these decision rules and even today there tends
to be confusion among the various mental conditions which can lead

to relief of responsibility.

The public’s fear regarding the insanity defense is quite reasonable

given that our learned courts display extreme confusion in so many cases
The author has personally witnessed, on a number of occasions, our
in
criminal justice system refuse to try persons who have engaged

which would
criminal activity but do not have any mental conditions
legally relieve them of responsibility.

These cases have involved

thus, the court
persons living in institutions for the retarded, and
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has attached the label of retardation to them without
examining data

regarding diagnosis.

However, if these persons had committed serious

crimes (e.g. murder) they would very likely have been tried.
The public’s faith in our criminal justice system’s dealings
with

insanity is further undermined by the "battle of the experts"
spectacle*

Where there are cases in which the defendant is supposedly

suffering from a mental disability, opposing psychiatrists frequently
S—ve contradicting testimony.

The public cannot help but conclude

that if we cannot even accurately identify persons who are mentally

disabled, then justice cannot be served in these proceedings.

The

outcome in these cases is, therefore, seen as threatening to society.
Not only does there exist a neglect of current knowledge, but

little research in this area has been conducted, and that which has

been done has not led to solid conclusions.

For example, the Predident's

Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia Q-966) found that since
1962, under the Durham rule, "insanity acquittals have stabilized at
two or three percent of all defendants."

Another study has found

that insanity acquittals in the District of Columbia before Durham

were between 0.2 percent and 0.6 percent of all defendants, and
following Durham these acquittals rose to six percent (Simon, 1967).

Why such variability among research results should exist is not clear.
It is evident, however, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to

draw conclusions from these data.

Although works such as the present one can point in new directions,
reached
firm conclusions regarding criminal responsibility cannot be
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until considerable research has been conducted.

To increase the

utility of this type of research, the legal profession must establish
standards, methods, and procedures which will allow comparisons

across projects.

Only when such comparisons occur can sense be made

of the literature in this area.
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CHAPTER

V

PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT

Most literature regarding criminal responsibility is concerned

with punishment and treatment, asserting that those who are not held
criminally responsible should receive treatment for any illegal
actions.

Treatment, if successful, assists the individual in staying

within legal boundaries.

On the other hand, persons who are convicted

of criminal offenses are candidates for punishment, a method intended
to discourage the offender from committing such criminal acts in

the future.

According to this line of reasoning, prisons are primary

agents for delivering punishment to offenders, and mental retardation
institutions or mental health institutions deliver treatment to those

relieved of criminal responsibility.
This chapter will examine the merits and validity of the punish-

ment and treatment differentiation as used by the criminal justice
system.

The concepts themselves will first be explored to distinguish

the theoretical differences between them.

Next, the actual performance

institutions
of prisons, and mental health and mental retardation
and
will be presented together with a discussion of the development

history of these facilities.
Punishment and Treatment as Concepts
system, is intended
Punishment, as utilized by the criminal justice

experience.
as more than merely a noxious or painful

Equally important

(Fitzgerald, 1962,
are the notions of authority and morals

p.

199 and
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Hall, 1960, p. 309).

Punishment can be defined as a coerced privation

that is inflicted by the state Can authority figure) upon persons who

have violated a set of rules established by society.

The extent of

punishment is, at least theoretically, somehow equivalent to the extent
of the harm created by the violation.

The infliction of punishment upon those who have violated societal
laws has a long history CBarnes & Teeters, 1950, p. 391), beginning in

primitive societies where it was used partially to protect the community
from further violations but for the primary purpose of placating the
gods by whom the wrong-does was believed to be "possessed."
In modern society, punishment is said to have four major objectives.

These objectives are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
individual intimidation CTappan, 1960,

p.

241).

Retribution satisfies society’s desire for revenge against the
offender CClyne, 1973, p. 86).

This retaliation is based on the

belief that man has free will and is responsible for his acts, and that,
therefore, society has the right to "balance the accounts."
the major thrust for retribution is moral.

Obviously,

Throughout history,

retribution has been the single largest component of punishment
CLeinwand, 1972, p. 22).

While retribution still is a significant

by statements
force in our criminal justice system and is evidenced
the morality of this
such as "making the punishment fit the crime,"

objective is highly
motivation and the wisdom of pursuing this

questionable.

to
It is likely that it is impossible

eradicate the

crimes are committed, but
moral outrage felt by society when serious
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the criminal justice system can and should he above such emotional
reactions.

Retribution does not assist in achieving the stated aim

of the criminal law to protect society and, in fact, may be counter-

productive.

A response which is oriented toward preventing future

offenses and thus protecting society would be more sound.

Deterrence as justification for punishment was first adopted in
the eighteenth century (Leopold, 1970).

This justification is believed

to prevent potential offenders from committing criminal acts by the

threat of punishment.

A potential offender, realizing that criminal

activity may lead to punishment may be motivated to avoid engaging in
,

those activities.

The effectiveness of deterrence has been questioned

by numerous authorities, many of whom have cited the example provided

by English justice 150 years ago (Leopold, 1970).
criminal punishment was

harsh.'

and public.

At that time,

Ricking pockets, for

example, was a crime which was punishable by death, and yet when

public hangings were being observed by enormous crowds, the occurrence
of pocket picking was extremely high.

Though this example does damage

to the deterrence theory, it does not wholly disprove it, and it is

some
still likely that deterrence has some impact on at least

individuals.

deterrence
Another variable which weakens the impact of the

convicted is known to
theory is that the likehood of being caught and

be very low.

those which
Host crimes are never reported to the police,

persons arrested cannot
are reported are usually not solved, and most
Service Committee, 1971,
be convicted of the crime (American Friends
p.
j

I

52).

deterrant is therefore
The thought of potential punishment as a
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surely decreased. as the probability of being caught and convicted
decreases.

Incapacitation as an objective of punishment seeks to remove
the offender from society and thereby render him unable to commit

additional offenses while incarcerated.

The imprisonment of criminals

does indeed place severe limits on the opportunities to engage in

criminal activities within the context of the society outside of
prison.

Incapacitation, therefore, is effective for the larger

society, if only temporarily.

However, incapacitation appears to have

much less impact on criminal activity in general since crime inside
prisons predominates (Leopold, 1970).

In order to weigh the overall

value of incapacitation, the probability of further criminal activity

must be assessed.

Whenever an individual is convicted and sentenced,

the length of the sentence should be directly related to the pro-

bability of committing future offenses.

There are data to indicate

that frequently murderers do not commit additional crimes whereas

with minor offenses such as prostitution, shoplifting, etc., there is
a high probability of repetition (Tappan, 1960, p. 256).

Obviously,

murderers receive much longer jail sentences than persons who commit
minor offenses

j

and therefor® the function of incapacitation is

with the
frequently weakened by matching the extent of punishment

seriousness of the offense.
recidivism in
Individual intimidation is directly related to
criminal offense should
that an offender who has been punished for a
experience.
be discouraged from repetition by this

Since the recidivism
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rate in the United States can reach as high as sixty percent, the

utility of this function is severely limited.

Additionally, many

persons believe that imprisonment may in fact be counter-productive
in that it embitters incarcerated individuals and thus leads them to

commit further crimes upon release.

Much has also been written to

indicate that prisoners, through their association with one another,

obtain additional ideas and skills to enable them to avoid capture when
committing future criminal acts.
Interestingly, treatment at times overlaps punishment.

Although

punishments dominant characteristic is frequently conceived as being
either painful or noxious, treatment, at times, may also involve pain,
often, in fact, a considerable amount.

For example, one can find

instances in psychology literature of the use of painful stimuli to
change a person 1

s

behavior.

Also, the treatment ideal states that

human behavior has antecedent causes and that behavioral scientists
can identify and specify these causes.

The ability to specify these

causes enables the scientist to change and control human behavior.

This identification of causes then leads to the design and implementation
interests of
of measures intended to effect behavioral changes in the
and also, in the
the individual *s happiness, health, and satisfactions

Weihofen, Edwards,
interest of society (Allen, 1973, p. 193 and Rubin,

Rosenzweig, 1963, p. 665).

Treatment then is not only concerned with

a belief in
the security of society but also with humanitarianism,

the worth and dignity of every human being.

Punishment and treatment

protecting society and preventing
are, therefore, both interested in
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future criminal acts.
The treatment model makes a number of assumptions.

First, when-

ever a person engages in illegal activity it is a problem of individual

pathology, and the frequency of this activity can be reduced by

treatment and the resultant cure (American Friends Service Committee,
1971, p. 40),

The causal factors behind crime probably go beyond the

individual and undoubtedly have some relationship to social variables

such as poverty, parental guidance, sub-culture influence, etc.
To the extent that these social variables influence the occurrence of

criminal activity, the assumption of individual pathology is undermined.
Second, the treatment model assumes that we know the individual

causes of crime or behavior (American Friends Service Committee, 1971,
p.

41).

Though society has and is generating scientific data which

enables it to understand behavior better than it has in the past, our

knowledge of the causal factors behind behavior remains quite limited.
Outside of the laboratory, our ability to either predict or understand
the causes of behavior remains very limited.

Third, the identification of causes leads to the specification
of treatment interventions.

Since the causes are poorly understood

must also
the types of treatment interventions which are implemented

be lacking.
treatment together
Upon examining the concepts of punishment and
level become clear.
the differences between them on a theoretical
to bear on an
Punishment involves a noxious experience brought

individual who has violated societal rules.

The extent of punishment
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is somehow related to the degree of harm created by the individual.

Treatment, while it may use noxious experiences, also uses many other

approaches.

The approach used is not determined by the criminal act

but, rather, by the causes behind the act and inevitably by what can

change the person’s behavior.

The treatment model therefore calls

for an individualized approach.

Treatment also demands the use of

knowledge obtained from the behavioral sciences in designing interventions.

Both punishment and treatment are aimed toward changing

the behavior of the offender, but the punishment model does so

exclusively for the benefit of society while the treatment model
focuses on both society and the individual offender.

Prisons

Prisons, as we know them today, were first established less than
two hundred years ago.

Prior to that, persons were held in prisons

while they waited either for trial or punishment.

Punishment, at

that time, consisted of torture, death, or mutilation (Leinwand, 1972,
p.

24).

Imprisonment was eventually eagerly substituted for this

brutality.
was established,
After America gained her independence and the nation
of criminality.
Americans believed that they had uncovered the cause

they believed that
With patriotic fervor and humanitarian values

colonial criminal codes
criminal behavior was perpetuated by the
the application of cruel and
(Rothman, 1971, p. 59) which called for
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severe punishments.

The problem with these codes was twofold.

First,

the severity of the punishments drove people to commit
further crimes
to avoid capture for the first one.

Second, punishment, to be

effective, had to be definite and consistant, and Americans, while

under British rule, had frequently seen juries turn guilty persons

free rather than sentence them to severe punishments for minor
infractions.

With missionary zeal Americans expected that punishment which was
certain and humane would eliminate or curtail criminal behavior, and
in the 1790’s a number of prisons were built as substitutes for

severe punishments.

This development of prisons as punishing devices

was a reflection of what was happening in much of Europe (Rothman,
1971, p. 61) and was an outgrowth of the development of humanitarian

ideals.

Since these early Americans identified the problem of criminal

behavior with the criminal code, prisons themselves were never
examined.

No one believed that prisons would rehabilitate offenders.

Instead it was felt that the loss of freedom, in and of itself, would

suffice to change the offenders’ behavior.

In these early prisons

the sentence length was directly related to the seriousness of the crime.
By the 182Q’ s Americans had lost faith in this early ideal, due
to the failure of the system to reduce criminal behavior (Rothman,

critics and
1971, p. 62) and the popularity of writings by prison

reformers such as John Howard (Bernes

&

Teeters, 1950, p. 480).

criminal codes
Americans, having lost their belief that the colonial

led

to criminal behavior,

turned to the individual offender

s
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for explanations.

Many biographical sketches were made

of offenders, and it seemed that all criminal behavior could be

traced to a childhood which lacked appropriate education and discipline
(Rothman, 1971, p. 68).

If one believed that a faulty environment

created criminal behavior, then all that need be done was to alter
the environment in which the offender lived.

Offenders could be

removed to a special environment which taught discipline and was
corruption-free.

John Howard, the greatest prison reformer of the time, first
pointed the way for the penitentiary system by examining conditions
in existing prisons and specifying the types of prisons which would

lead to the rehabilitation of offenders.

He made the reformation of

prisons his life's work after having been captured by a French

privateer and incarcerated in a number of French prisons (Barnes
Teeters, 1950, p. 480).

&

After this ordeal ended he spent a number

of years visting prisons throughout Europe, his writings not only

exposing the deplorable conditions he observed but making recommendations regarding humane treatment, sanitary conditions, etc.

He is

also credited with first recommending that prisoners be kept isolated
idea which
so that they could reflect upon their transgressions, an

was to lead to the development of the penitentiary (Leinwand, 1972,
p.

24).

a
The word "penitentiary" comes from Latin and suggests

Howard was
place to do penance for sins, and the idea postulated by
his behavior, he would
that if an offender was forced to think about

see the error of his ways.
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The penitentiaries which were finally
developed were perceived
as providing a solution to a rising
crime problem.

More than that,

however, these institutions were supposed to
have dramatic impact

on society as a whole by demonstrating
proper socialization.

me

When

community observed the success that these institutions
had,

society would adopt the practices used by the
penitentiary.

Given

this belief, the early penitentiaries received
considerable publicity

md

were the pride of the nation.

Since penitentiaries primarily

called for isolation of prisoners, architecture absorbed
these early
reformers.

Considerable effort was put into designing a facility that

made it impossible for prisoners to communicate with each other without
official sanction,

Pennsylvania was the first state to establish this new type of
correctional facility when, in 1829, the Eastern Penitentiary was
cuilt: in

Philadelphia,

This institution epitomized the most influential

penal philosophy ever conceived by man (Barnes

&

Teeters, 1950, p. 507).

The dominant principle at the Eastern Penitentiary was solitude or

separate confinement, a separation complete except for rare visits
from ''moral instructors".

The facility contained "four hundred large

solitary cells in seven cell blocks emanating from a central rotunda,

each cell having a small individual exercise yard.

Massive walls

surrounded the institution and divided its parts so as to eliminate all
contact and to make escape impossible" (Tappan, 1960,

p.

607).

Margaret Wilson (1931, pp. 219-220) has provided some insight
regarding what it was like living in the Eastern Penitentiary.

When
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an offender arrived he was given a hot bath and a uniform.

He was then

led blindfolded to the rotunda where, still blindfolded, he "met' 1 the

warden and the rules of the facility were described.

Still blindfolded

he was led to his cell where finally the bandage was removed from his
eyes.

The cell he lived in was less than twelve feet long and eight

feet wide.

If the cell was on the ground floor he could see a small

courtyard, the same size as the cell, highly walled, within which he

could sometimes exercise.

The prisoner stayed in that cell and

courtyard without any change for his entire sentence.

He was completely

cut off from the world and was not allowed visitors or mail.

The guard

who brought meals was the primary person who had contact with the prisoner but the guard was not allowed to speak when delivering this
food.

After three days in the cell the prisoner was allowed to work

if he requested it.

Nearly all prisoners made this request and prison

reformers pointed to this as indicating that their scheme was working.
However, just as eating and sleeping occurred in solitude, work assign-

ments were carried out in the individual prisoner’s cell.

Prisoners

were to leave the facility without knowing who else was incarcerated
there.

Pennsylvania quickly established a second institution, the

Western Penitentiary in Pittsburgh.

This facility operated on the

same principles as the Eastern Penitentiary.

A second state attempting

to

reform its penal system was New York,

erecting a penitentiary at Auburn in 1821,

This facility had smaller

three and one half
cells than the Eastern Penitentiary: seven by
feet, and no exercise yard was included.

Additionally, work was not

Ill

provided.

This extreme idleness and separation quickly produced a

marked prevalence of physical illness and mental disturbance (Barnes
& Teeters,

1950, p. 520), and in 1924 a compromise which became

known as the Auburn "silent” system was adopted.
called for solitary confinement only at night.

The Auburn system

Work activities

occurred in congregate areas under a strict rule of silence.

Manufact-

urers soon secured contracts to operate factories at Auburn which

employed prisoners at low wages (Tappan, 1960,

p.

609).

enterprises within Auburn soon proved to be profitable.

Manufacturing
Auburn, in

an effort to control and eliminate communication among inmates,

instituted rules calling for marching in military lock step fashion

when going to and from activities.

Prisoners were to keep their eyes

only upon their work in the workshop and on the guard when marching
and silence was to be observed at all times.

rules were severely punished.

Violations of these

The Auburn system led to greater pro-

duction output than the Pennsylvania system, (Tappan, 1960,

p.

609)

and this, probably more than any other reason, explains the popularity
of the Auburn system.

The productivity of the prisoners generated

revenue for the state and thereby made it less expensive to run the
facility.

later
In 1925 New York started a second penitentiary which

had followed
became known as Sing Sing, and soon most other states

penitentiaries.
the example of New York, opening Auburn-system

differences between
Considerable controversy was generated by the
the Pennsylvania and Auburn systems.

The debate regarding these

approximately 18/0
differences was intense and was carried on until
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(Barnes & Teeters, 1950, p. 533),

Since both models called for pre-

venting prisoners from communicating with one another, the disagreement
centered around whether or not prisoners should work silently in

large groups or in solitary cells.

The Pennsylvania system insisted

that their model carried the doctrine of isolation and reflection
to its logical conclusion.

This arrangement prevented prisoners

from contaminating one another.

One result of allowing prisoners

to gather in large groups was they would recognize one another and

thus increase the probability of their getting together for criminal

activities once released (Rothman, 1971, p. 87).

The Auburn system

was seen as encouraging cruelty since the rules in that system were
frequently broken.

Advocates of the Auburn system insisted that their

model led to the reformation of the prisoner while at the
being economically expedient.

same,

time

The controversy between these systems

died out around 1879 when the inadequacy of each as a means for

reforming offenders was recognized and strict rules regarding silence
and solitude were gradually changed.
Not only did these penitentiaries fail at carrying out their

mission of reforming prisoners but they also failed at carrying cut
the dictates of their models.

Pennsylvania, for example, found it

impossible to completely separate prisoners.

Soon after the Eastern

place two prisoners
Penitentiary was in operation it became necessary to
in performing work
in one cell at selected times so that training

functions could be carried on (Barnes

&

Teeters, 1950, p. 516).

Wanes

3.13

(1923, pp. 157-159) has identified the inventive techniques used by

prisoners to communicate with one another.

For example, prisoners

established codes to tap out messages on water pipes.

Soon doubling

up of prisoners became necessary since state capital appropriations

did not keep up with the growing population.

Since discipline was an important component in these penitentiaries

and the rules established by them were commonly broken, harsh punish-

ments became common, frequently being sadistic in nature (Rothman,
1971, p. 102)

.

This reliance on harsh treatment was exemplified most

clearly by Elam Lynds, the principal keeper directly under the warden
at the Auburn prison at its inception.

Lynds was a firm believer in

flogging and used it to enforce the rules.

Lynds became warden there.

When Sing Sing opened,

He believed (Wines, 1895,

p.

149) that pri-

soners could not be changed unless their spirits were broken and that
the purpose of penal discipline was to accomplish this so that

offenders wonld develop good work habits and religious attitudes.

Lynds encouraged his officers to treat prisoners with contempt and

to

inflict cruel punishments.
rise of
The combination of the failure of penitentiaries and the
for the current
social Darwinism in American thought paved the way

state of penal institutions.

Darwin published The Origin of the Specie s

of the nineteenth century
in 1859, and during tha last three decades

Darwin's work dominated
and the beginning of the twentieth century
1967,
social thought in the United States (Hofstadter,

p.

4).

At that

was generated which attempted
time a considerable amount of literature
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to apply Darwinian thought to social disciplines, spawning the
resultant

social darwinism.

Phrases such as "struggle for survival" and "survival

of the fittest" led to the conclusion that the best competitors in a

society would dominate and that this process would lead to continual
improvement.

The development and improvement of society must occur

at a very slow pace and natural selection would be the primary process
in accomplishing this.

Any attempts to tamper with this natural pro-

cess through social reform efforts would lead only to degeneration.

Herbert Spencer, an English writer, spent considerable time
applying Darwin* s theory to social issues and had considerable impact
on American thought.

According to Spencer, sociology had the task of

identifying the normal course of social evolution and condemning all
types of behavior that interfer with it (Spencer, 1874, pp. 70-71).

Social science should demonstrate that social control was impossible
and man should readily submit to natural forces.

Spencer (1864, pp.

79-80) opposed such things as banking and postal systems, poor laws,

state-supported education, and regulation of housing conditions.

William Graham Summer of Yale University was the most influential
and effectively spread his philosophy

social Darwinist in America

through widely read hooka and magazines (Hofstadter, 1967,

p.

51).

his fight
Summer, as Spencer, effectively used social determinism in

against social reformers.

evolution and should not

Society was the product of centuries of
be.

tampered with.

society could only lead to disaster (Summer,

Attempts uO refashion
193*4,

Vol. I, p« 105).

at a very slow
To Summer, society was an organism that changed only

rate.

there were
He viewed reformers as meddlers who believed that
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no natural laws governing the social order and that they could make

the world over with artificial ones (Summer, 1934, Vol.

I,

p.

215).

He expected social Darwinism to negate this erroneous belief.
The emergence of social Darwinism appeared to explain the failure
of previous efforts to reform the penal system.

Additionally, it

indicated that further reform efforts were not only doomed to failure

Hut would cause additional harm.

Offenders, under the doctrine of

survival of the fittest, were certainly not viewed as having desirable

characteristics which society wanted to nurture.
ism devalued such offenders as human beings.

Rather, social Darwin-

The American Breeder’s

Association, whose membership included persons such as Alexander

Graham Bell, became concerned with heredity in the human race.

In

1910 the association had committees on mental retardation, mental
illness, criminality, deaf-mutism, mental traits, epilepsy, and

immigration (Blanton, 1975, p. 177).

With this type of thinking

dominant, any discussion of improving conditions in prison was unlikely.

The problems that plagued prisons before Darwinian thought went unresolved, and since society turned its back on prisons, conditions

deteriorated.

Although social Darwinism is not today a major force in American
system
thought, the impact this philosophy had upon the American penal
is still all too readily apparent.

While there has been recent concern

over prison conditions and even renewed efforts to rehabilitate
offenders, these efforts have proved to be inadequate.

They frequently

with
take the form of tinkering with existing reality rather than
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enacting a total system change (Tappan, 1960, p. 237).

While lip

service is frequently given rehabilitating offenders, it is usually
difficult to find anything in our prisons which appears to be

designed to reform prisoners (Brelje, 1976).

Numerous authors have

supplied testimony regarding the degrading conditions of prison life
(Harris, 1967; Clemmer, 194Q; Lindner, 1946; Gaddis, 1955; Griswold,

Misenheimer, Powers, and Tromanhauser , 1970; Cressey, 1958; and
Sykes, 1958)

,

While a loss of personal freedom is a punishing ex-

perience, the conditions within prison typically add additional punish-

ment onto the loss of freedom.
The director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
has stated that the term that best describes prisons is "evil" (Satten,
1963).

Indeed, when individuals are placed in a desperate situation

and experience a total loss of rights, serious problems are bound to
occur.

As late as 1967 incidents of torture, beatings, rape, murder,

and medical malpractice were reported by the press to be occurring in

the Tucker Prison Farm in Arkansas.

Cells which were originally

constructed to provide solitude for one man are frequently still in

use except that now, two, three, or four man are frequently found

within them and solitary confinement for long periods of time is still
in use (McGraw & McGraw, 1954, p. 5).

The President's Commission on

Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) described life
in,

prison as barren and futile at best and unspeakably brutal and

degrading at worst.

The Commission also cited drastic shortages of

resources including personnel and facilities, poorly trained and
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underpaid staff, unnecessary restrictions on inmate communication, the

marching of prisoners from one activity to another, overcrowding,
domination of prisoners by the most aggressive inmate, staff sanctioning of rackets, violence, corruption and coerced homosexuality, and

the existence of numerous prisons that are over one hundred years old
as common in our corrections systems.

Beside the application of punishment for the infraction of rules

which seem meaningless, Leinwand (1972,

p.

58)

cites the following as

representative of the ills plaguing American prisons: inadequate
funding, overcrowding, poorly trained and paid personnel, inadequate

professional personnel, inadequate and poor food, limited opportunities
for work and recreation, inadequate educational opportunities, homo-

sexual rapes, drug addiction, crime, brutal punishment for infraction
of rules, racial tensions, and poor or inadequate medical treatment.

Ramsey Clark (1975,

p.

193) has stated that prisons, by giving

absolute power to the staff over nearly helpless people, lead to the
corruption of power.
degradation".

He refers to prisons as "warehouses of human

And his assessment of prisons (pp 194-201) agrees with

that provided by Leinwand,

Mental Health and Mental Retardation Institutions

Rothman (1971, pp, 109-236), in an exceptional work, traced the
development of mental health institutions to the first half of the

nineteenth century.

Prior to that time mental illness was viewed as

God's will and primarily a problem of poverty and dependence.

118

Individuals who were mentally ill either received assistance by
living

with relatives or the town provided assistance
in their home.

to the afflicted person

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however,

questions regarding the causes of mental illness and the treatment
of those afflicted were raised.

These questions were prompted by

calculations that the incidence of the malady was increasing in
America, and intensive efforts at identifying causal factors were
initiated.

The cause of mental illness was felt to be related not to body

chemistry but to the social organization of America.

In particular,

it was thought that social, economic, and political influences were

critical and that the debilitating effects of these influences were

only present in relatively civilized societies.

Primitive societies

were thought to have been free from mental illness.

The concern

over mental illness was heightened by this belief, since Americans

typically believed their country to be the most civilized nation
in the world.

The research intended to identify causal factors turned up very

little that was pleasing.

The new nation appeared to be fraught with

dangers to mental health.

A

lack, of stability and the dissolving

Oi.

traditions were seen to create stresses and strains which at times

overwhelmed individuals.

The unusually fluid social order of America

was not viewed with pride, but, rather, as problematic.

In a society

their fathers and
where sons did not automatically assume the work of

upon individual
employment potential was viewed as unlimited and based
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skills, it was inevitable that some persons, consumed
with ambition,

would aim at accomplishments which they were incapable
of achieving.
For many, mental powers were strained to their utmost
and the result

was often mental illness.
Dangers lay in wait even for those who achieved lofty aims, for
once reached, the socio-economic level was significantly changed and
the resultant change in life style was often difficult to adjust to.
The change from a simple life to a more complex one was accompanied

by considerable anxiety centered around the transition itself
and around the desire to maintain the new position.

Since upward

mobility created such strains, it was felt to be a frequent contributor
to mental illness.

Democracy was viewed as contributing to society’s mental problems.
The ordinary voter was felt to be in a state of constant turmoil over
one issue or another and which candidates to vote into office.

Political

debates and elections created public agitation which taxed mental
faculties.

This burden of responsibility of a democratic society led

at times to mental illness.

A lack of stability in the accepted body of knowledge

of the day

American society was going through profound

also took its toll,

Beliefs and traditions which had previously

change at this time.

been held were constantly being questioned and the generation of new
.

ideas and knowledge was occurring at an ever increasing pace.

If sucn

a proinquiries had been confined to those who were highly educated,

blem may not have existed.
.

But many Americans without formal educatxon
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and lacking an appreciation of logic were actively
involved in dis-

cussing complex subjects.

The result was excessive mental strain and

frequently mental illness.
The family and the school, both having the ability to
moderate
the dangers found in society, were seen as chief villians
in the

situation and the frantic and unstable qualities of society were

primarily attributed to them.

Schools admitted children too early,

kept them in classroom too long, crammed children with information as

quickly as possible, and considered recreation and rest to be a waste
of valuable time.
ed in the home.

Worse yet, the attitudes of the schools were supportParents instilled their children with ambitions

for social and intellectual achievement and insisted that schools convey

ever increasing amounts of knowledge to their children.

The family,

which could have protected children from the adverse effects of
society, was charged with heightening the impact of these factors.

Like the reformers who found the origins of crime in the community,
psychiatrists linked mental illness to social organization.
implications for both crime and mental illness were similar.

The

That is,

wherever the individual turned, some hazard which was beyond his
control waited for him.

The existence of vice in society turned a

person toward crime, and mental stress created by societal pressures
lad to mental illness.

Concepts such as these led eventually to the

belief that mental illness was curable.

All one need do was to change

the environment for a person who was mentally ill.

Ideally, changing

society would have produced the best result, but since tnat

taste

was
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far too overwhelming, a second solution became attractive.

That is, a

separate environment which did not have the stress and chaos found in
the larger society would be established by psychiatrists.

This new

environment would exemplify the advantages of an orderly, regular, and

disciplined routine.

Such a setting, by isolating afflicted persons

from the adverse effects of society, in addition to helping the
individual in question, would demonstrate the benefits of this system
to the larger society.

The missionary zeal behind this movement must

not be underestimated.

The ideal setting which was being prescribed

led to the development of mental health institutions.

These institutions

were not only supposed to cure mental illness but were also to lead
to the education and reformation of the total society by their example.

The development of these institutions was rapid.

one state, Virginia, had a public institution.

Before 1810 only

By 1850 almost every

northeastern and midwestern state supported a mental health institution
and by 1860, twenty eight of the thirty three states had public facilities.

With the establishment of these institutions there also came

what was later to be called the "cult of curability" (Deutsch, 1949,
p.

133).

The cult of curability, which was advocated by psychiatrists

and their lay supporters, insisted that mental illness was not only

curable but was more curable than most other ailments.

It was believed

could cure
that appropriately designed and organized institutions

almost every case of mental illness.
called for the
The new program for treating mental illness first

prompt removal of afflicted persons from the community.

At the very
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first sign of mental illness the individual was to enter a mental
institution.

community.

Second, the institution was to be separate from the
It was to be built far from population centers and was to

function as independently from the surrounding community as possible.
The setting for institutions was to be tranquil and rural, and the

facility was to reinforce isolation by prohibiting visits and correspondence.

Third, moral treatment was to be provided.

Moral treatment

would provide an antidote for the instability of society and would
curb uncontrolled impulses by creating a fixed and stable environment.
In providing this treatment, facilities had to control residents in a

humane manner, creating as little stress as possible.

This, of course,

was a difficult task and in order to accomplish it superintendents
designed and implemented an extremely rigid routine and calendar and
insisted upon daily labor.

A rigid, carefully spelled out schedule

and regular work became the prescription for cure within these

institutions.

The insistence upon work was not only believed to be

therapeutic but was also economically sound.
Obviously, a stress upon orderliness and rigid schedules calls for

extreme control of residents in such a facility.

These early

discipline in
facilities stressed the importance of avoiding punitive

institutions which
carrying out their mission and though there were
did.
did not abide by this concept, most probably

A great deal or

large, these early
administrative diligence was necessary but by and

harsh punishments
institutions did succeed in doing away with

treating patients in a humane fashion.

anci

m
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One of the most astounding discoveries in the records of this

reform effort is the statistical information which these early
institutions generated.

The published rates for cures were greatly

exaggerated and superintendents deliberately distorted data, some
going so far as to declare a one hundred percent cure rate.
Cp.

Rothman

132) believes that personal ambition played a considerable part

in the distorting of this information since frequently state

bureaucracies used the number of reported recoveries in determining
appointments and promotions.

Superintendents often found themselves

in the position of trying to outdo one another, and as soon as one

superintendent announced his results, other superintendents were
encouraged to match if not exceed his.

With the absence of any infor-

mation to disprove these announcements, the erroneous claims tended
to substantiate, one another.

In addition, the claims were used as

arguments to obtain additional support from state legislatures.

was not until the 1870

T

s

that the claims were finally disproved.

It

One

in
cannot help but be amazed at the existence of a forty year period

no serious
our history when novel and radical claims were made, and yet

challenge to those claims was forthcoming.

At any rate, by the end of

American society no
the 1870’s the cult of curability was dead and
mental illness.
longer believed it had the ability to cure
no public or private
Prior to the nineteenth century there were
of the mentally
facilities charged with the care and education

retarded on the North American continent.

Before the establishment

who could not care for themselves
of such facilities, retarded persons
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experienced the same treatment as the mentally ill.

Even after the

establishment of mental health institutions the retarded continued to
be a neglected group and could frequently be found in early mental

health institutions (JBaumeister, 1970).
The impetus for the development of institutions for the retarded

originated in Europe.

Johann Guggenbuhl is acknowledged as the

originator of the idea of institutionalized care for the mentally

retarded (Kanner, 1964, p, 3Q)

.

In 184Q he established an institution

to provide educational and residential services in Switzerland.

Other

work in Europe provided hope that the retarded could be educated.
For example, the work of Jean Itard and his successor Edward Sequin

affected the commonly held perceptions of a retarded person's ability
to learn and develop Chest, 1965, p. 163)..

The two men developed

two methods of "teaching the retarded which were later to be adopted
in the institutions of the United States (Baumeister , 1970).

The

first was called the physiological method and was a system

sensory-

of

motor activities that varied from simple muscle activities to
complex vocational and social skills.

The second was called moral

treatment and called for retarded persons to be treated with dignity,
warmth, and kindness.
institutions
Samuel Howe is credited with the development of
p. 39).
for the retarded in the United States CKanner, 1964,

In 1845

home and personally
he took a group of retarded children into his

supervised their education.

In 1846 he was able to convince the

condition of the mentally
Massachusetts legislature to investigate the
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retarded in the Commonwealth and also to determine whether
anything
could be done for their relief.

presented the report in 1848.

Howe, as chairman of the committee,

The report convinced the legislature

that methods had been found to teach the retarded and that it was

the responsibility of the Commonwealth to provide education for all
its children.

The legislature responded by funding, for a three year

period, an experimental school for a small number of retarded children.

Three years later a committee evaluating the school declared the

experiment a success.

The legislature, based upon that evaluation,

established a permanent institution which later became known as the

Walter E. Fernald State School in Waltham, Mass.
Other states soon followed suit.

In 1851 a residential school

for the mentally retarded was opened in Albany, New York.

In 1853

Pennsylvania established the third institution for the retarded, the

Pennsylvania Training School for Feebleminded Children.

Ohio built

an institution in Columbus in 1857, and in 1858 Connecticut followed
the course of the other states.

By 1874 there were seven state

institutions and several private ones in existence (Best, 1965, p. 170).
By the end of the nineteenth century more than half of the states had

either public or private institutions for the retarded.
The founders of the first institutions had as their goal the

return of the retarded person to the community.

The early literature

method.
demonstrates a blind faith in the efficacy of the physiological

development of
Mental retardation was conceptualized as a lag in the
trained.
intelligence and with hard work the mind could be

Sequin even
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believed that the cranium enlarged with education and that mental
retardation could be cured,

Considerable effort was made to inform

the public that these new institutions were schools and not custodial
in nature and, in fact, they made no provision for permanent custody

(Baumeister, 1970),

Reports from these early institutions tended to reflect amazing
results (Baumeister, 197Q).

The experimental school in Massachussetts

declared that it was entirely successful and had proved that retardation

was curable,

Baumeister believes that superintendents used these

glowing reports to convince a skeptical citizenry and legislature that
their work was worthwhile.

Indeed, many persons believed that little

could be done to benefit the retarded.

Reactions of fear and aversion

were frequently associated with mental retardation and many persons
believed that

ta-x

dollars could be better spent.

Persons, however, who were involved in establishing these

facilities went about their work with humanitarian zeal and believed
their efforts went toward rescuing afflicted members of society from
their condition (Best, 1965, p, 171).

expressed in

the.

This zeal, similar to that

movements to establish, penitentiaries and mental

institutions, was part of a wave of humanitarianism which swept the
country.
to

The data from the mental health institutions gave courage

therr belief
the reformers in mental retardation and reinforced

that all handicaps could be overcome.

The wave of humanitarianism

the time (Best,
was evidenced most clearly in religious papers of
as miraculous and
1965, p. 191), which looked upon the movements
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gave their total support to them.

Religious papers, when mentioning

the reform efforts, described them in glowing terms.
By the 1870

?

s,

however, it had become apparent that many of the

earlier claims of success were inaccurate.

The physiological method

was no longer viewed as being capable of producing the results

previously believed.

The role of the institution as an educational

agent began to evaporate and custodial care began to assume a position
of dominance in these facilities.

By 1875 leaders in the field called

for long term custodial care, and a trend began toward construction
of larger institutions.

Indeed, the American Association of Mental

Deficiency stated in 1876 that only a small number of the retarded
are capable of community living (Doll, 1962).

It is curious to note

that institutions were built at a faster rate after they were regarded
as custodial rather than education in intent (Baumeister, 1970).

Both mental health and mental retardation institutions were
developed with the promise that they could provide a useful service
for both society and individual clients.

As with prisons, their failure

to produce good results received public attention about the time

when social Darwinism became popular.

Additionally, the eugenics

mentally
movement hnd dramatic negative impact on the plight of the

retarded and the mentally ill.

The eugenics movement, more than any

and prevented any
other factor, led to the decay of these facilities

further efforts at reform.

The movement postulated that many

retardation, and habitual
characteristics such as mental illness, mental
and that allowing persons
criminality,- are the direct result of heredity
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with these characteristics to propagate would increase their occurence
in the general population,

Richard Dugdale in 1877 published a book which was to become
a landmark in eugenics literature,

Dugdale, who was a penologist,

noticed several persons from the same family incarcerated in a prison.
Ee conducted a genealogical survey and was able to obtain information
on seven hundred and nine descendants.

Of these, one hundred forty

had been imprisoned, two hundred eighty were dependent upon public
support, and a majority had low moral standards.

In 1912 Henry

Goddard, a leader in the field of mental retardation, published The

Kallikak Family .

Goddard claimed that his research showed beyond a

shadow of a doubt that mental retardation and other undesirable
characteristics had been transmitted by heredity for generations in
a given family,'

Ando so, for a time, this type of literature

abounded (Kanner, 1964, pp. 128-138).

To make matters worse, it was

believed that the efforts made to assist mentally retarded or mentally
ill people inevitably led to an increase of these conditions in

society by enabling such persons to live without supervision.
The eugenics movement had several results.

First, any thought of

ill to live in the
educating the retarded or helping the mentally

community became unthinkable.

Why should society assist devalued

increase the community's problems?
persons when such assistance can only

afflicted persons from proSecond, in an effort to prevent these

prohibiting them from marriage
creating, a number of states passed laws
sterilize certain individuals.
and gave the state the authority to
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In 1914 (Smith, Wilkinson, & Wagoner, 1914) thirty nine states had

laws forbidding persons such as the retarded, the mentally ill, and

epileptics from marrying.

Assisting in the marriage of or engaging

in intercourse with such persons could be punishable by imprisonment.

Twelve states gave the authority to sterilize certain persons in
prisons, mental health institutions, and mental retardation institutions.

Included in the list of persons eligible for surgery were habitual
criminals, the mentally ill and the retarded.

Third, the nature of

the early institutions for the mentally ill and the retarded was
changed.

When they were established, those institutions, were primarily

concerned with the well-being of individual clients.

But after the

coming of the eugenics movement, they became primarily concerned with

protecting society (Emerick, 1912).-

Fourth, the eugenics movement

further devalued the mentally ill and retarded and increased the
fear associated with these groups, creating an atmosphere in which

many forms of client abuse were allowed to develop and prosper.
One need make only a casual search of the literature on the

subject to conclude that mental health institutions' have still not

recovered from the adverse effects of social Darwinism and the

eugenics movement.

To Thomas Szasz O-970, p. 58), mental institutions

appear harsh and oppressive.
&

Other researchers (e.g. Herz, Endicott,

have shown a
Spitzer, 1975; Sommer, 1959; and Nettler, 1952)

these facilities and
negative relationship between length of stay in

outcome.

the American Medical
Grimes (1949), who through his work with

forty percent of
Association' was able to personally visit
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tut ions, in the United States and read reports regarding
the remaining

sixty percent, concluded that treatment tended to be totally
absent
in these facilities.

He found that psychiatrists did not help

matters and that their "orders, euphemistically called treatments,
are carried out by guards, behind locked doors, to the accompaniment
of insult, intimidation, and abuse" (p. 16).

Abuse of patients in

the facilities was rampant and involved diverse approaches including

beatings with a bar of soap in a sock of forcing a patients head under

water until he strangled (pp 101-102)

.

All patients were abused at

One time or another, and the most abused group tended to be those who
are the most helpless and thus, most in need of assistance

(p.

58).

Institutions were typically overcrowded, and the residential areas

violated fire codes

(p.

70).

Many residents spent twenty-four hours

a day naked, filthy, and in restraints or seclusion rooms.

Grimes

concluded that through public neglect and a lack of legislative
financial support these institutions are "little more than concentration
,

camps" (p. 69).

Other authors have found that staff members in these institutions

wield all the power and that patients find themselves in a position
always subservient to staff (Deyereux, 1944; Bateman
and Stanton & Schwartz, 1954, p. 170).

&

Dunham, 1949,

The American Civil Liberties

rights that
Union became so concerned over the violation of patients’

patients of
they supported the publication of a book advising these

their rights (Ennis

&

Siegel, 1973).

LeBar (1964) found that the roles

frequently
which develop among institutionalized mental patients are
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not consistent with therapeutic goals and there is a tendency
for

dominance-submissive relationships to be formed.

Conditions in these

institutions have been so bad that courts have at last become involved.
For example, at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, the mental institution in
the District of Columbia, the court, in answering a right-to-treatment
suit, found that patients frequently receive no treatment at all

(Rouse V. Cameron, 1966).

It is important to note that under the

Durham ruling, persons found not guilty due to insanity were frequently
sent to St. Elizabeths,

Bateman and Dunham (1949)

alization

f.or

t

in exploring the realities of institution-

mental patients, concluded that patients spent a consid-

erable amount of time protecting themselves from the more vicious or

dangerous aspects of their environment.
facilities tended to impede

They also found that these

recovery by an insufficient quantity of

organized activity, therapeutic interventions and staff training.

There also tended to be a lack of respect for patient wishes and an
emphasis on detailed and, at times, trivial rules whose violation

predictably resulted in punishment.

Lima State Hospital in Ohio, a mental health facility for the
criminally insane, was rocked by an expose conducted by The Plain Dealer
a Cleveland daily newspaper.

The articles described vicious beatings

staff to
(Whelan & Widman, Hay 14, 1971), the abusive use of drugs by

control patients (Whelan

& Widman,

May 17, 1971), the use of electric

shock treatments as punishment G^helan
sexual rape (Whelan

&

&

Widman, May 20, 1971), homo-

practices
Widman, May 25, 1971), negligent medical

,

,
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(Whelan & Widman May 26, 1971), and murder (Whelan & Widman May
27, 1971
1971).

Obviously, such as environment can hardly be called therapeutic.

Mental retardation institutions appear to be plagued with the same

problems as mental health institutions.

As of 1968 there were 167

mental retardation institutions in the United States (Baumeister,
1970).

The rated capacity of these institutions was 191,587 persons

and, since this rated capacity included some institutions that had

not yet opened and the actual population was found to be 199,694

individuals, it can be concluded that considerable crowding exists.

The professional staff in these institutions frequently does not
meet the qualification standards acceptable in the community (Baumeinster
1970, 1967),

For example, many physicians in these settings are not

licensed for private practice.

Attendants, who are the most in-

fluential staff' in respect to the everyday welfare of the mentally

retarded client, are poorly paid, receive little if any training, and

usually have poor skills relative to the tasks they have to perform
(Baumeister, 197Q).

A number of authors believe that institutions have detrimental
effects upon the ability levels of mentally retarded persons residing

with them.

Herber and Deyer (1970) believe that present institutions,

regimentation of
because of their isolation from the community, the
rules, are poor
clients, and the existence of numerous and repressive

settings for habilitation.

These settings create their own cultures

therefore, when
which are at contrast with the community and

a retarded

adjustment
client moves from the institution to the community,
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*-

cu lties occur.

While some research efforts have not demonstrated

that institutions have adverse effects upon retarded clients, the vast

bulk have so stated.
(1959)

,

Research by Badt (1958) Denny (1964).

Lyle

and Schlanger (1954) have shown that institutions have

deleterious effects on such behaviors as language ability, ability
to abstract,

and ability to learn discrimination tasks.

Courts

(Parisi, et. al. V, .Carey et, Al., 1975), have even found that

treatment tends to be entirely absent in many of these facilities.
Other information exists which suggests that not only do mental

retardation institutions fail to provide treatment but that they all
too frequently represent cruel and unusual punishment.

Blatt and

Kaplan (1966), visting one of these facilities during the Christmas
season of 1965, labeled it a "hellhole" and found human beings living
in conditions that the community would not tolerate for animals.

A right to treatment suit brought in Alabama for two mental health
institutions and one mental retardation institution found that
clients had been denied their right to treatment and the conditions
at these facilities were "grossly substandard, hazardous and deplorable"

(Wyatt et. al, V. Stickney et, al., 1972),

The court was so disturbed

over the conditions it found that it issued an emergency order to

protect the lives and well-being of the clients.

The court concluded

and only led to
that these institutions were not furnishing treatment

deterioration and debilitation of clients.

Safety and sanitary

of residents were
conditions were so poor that the health and lives

overcrowded; conditions
endangered; wards were grossly understaffed and

,
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were such that simple custodial care became impossible.

Clients

were frequently mistreated, abused, and subjected to corporal
punishment.
A right to treatment suit filed in Massachussetts (Ricci, et. al.

V • Greenblatt, et. al.

,

1973) on behalf of clients residing in a

dental retardation institution claimed that a lack of treatment was

only one problem at the facility.

Conditions at the institution were

said to be "so shockingly oppressive, unsanitary, unhealthy and

degrading that they are an affront to basic human decency."

Not only

was there an absence of developmental services, but medical services

were typically poor or absent.

The brief cited frequent heterosexual

and homesexual attacks, physical assualts, the abusive use of chemical
and physical restraints, the frequent use of cruel punishment, the

existence of residential areas which violated the State Sanitary Code,
the presence of excrement and urine which were visible and unattended,
the overpowering odor which was present in living areas, the fact that

raw sewage had at times backed up into residential areas, a continual
shortage of sanitation supplied, and an ever-present clothing shortage,

which caused many clients to be continually nude.

The court found

the cited charges to be a reflection of actual conditions and consent

decree in favor of the plaintiffs was accepted.

A right to treatment suit filed in Ohio CSidles,
et.

al,

,

1975) alleged similar conditions.

et.

al. V. Delany

The court recognized the

proposed by
allegations as accurate and accepted a consent decree

state officials.

During a recent conference, Michael Thrasher (1976),
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from the United States Justice Department, stated that his
office

was currently involved in twenty-two right to treatment suits.

Thesd suits involve both mental health and mental retardation
institutions and his visits to these and other similar settings has
led him. to conclude that mental health and mental retardation facilities

frequently represent cruel and unusual punishment rather than treatment

.

Summ ary and Conclusions

Traditionally, arguments regarding criminal responsibility have

revolved around whether the offender should receive punishment or
treatment for the offense.

Persons found not guilty due to insanity

are typically sent to either a mental health institution if they are

emotionally disturbed, or to a mental retardation institution
they are retarded.

if

These two types of facilities supposedly provide

treatment to the offender.

Prisons, on the other hand, are supposed

to represent punishment.

Punishment is defined as the delivery of a noxious experience by
an authority figure to someone who has violated the law.

Punishment

can have one or more of the following as its goals j retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and individual intimidation.

Treatment

refers to an individualized approach in that each offender is evaluated
to

determine the cause of the criminal behavior which results in a plan

of action designed to prevent law breaking in the future.

The plan of

treataction can involve noxious experiences, and both punishment and
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rnent

have behavior change as an objective.
Prisons and mental health and mental retardation institutions

are conceptualized as total institutions (Goffman, 1961
total institution is

a

p. XIII).

A

"place of residence and work where a large

number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society
for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed,

formally administered round of life."

All these facilities are fairly

recent and were "invented" during the nineteenth century in reform
movements.

Prisons were developed first to end the cruel and harsh

punishments formerly given out in court, and second, to change the

behavior of convicted criminals by placing them in a vice-free
environment and forcing them to reflect on the error of their ways.

Mental health institutions also originated in a concern for the wellbeing of certain individuals.

At that time it was believed that

societal instability was the cause of mental disturbance and,
therefore, that placing a mentally disturbed person in a stable

environment in an institution should lead to recovery.

Besides

being interested in helping their client populations, both prisons
and mental health institutions also had a much more ambitious goal.

Leaders in these reform movements believed that prisons and mental

health institutions, by demonstrating what they could do, would lead
to the reform of society as a whole.

Mental retardation institutions

and the mission
originated with a concern for the retarded individual,

services in
of the early facilities was to provide developmental

order to enable retarded persons to live in the community.
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Both the origins and histories of these total institutions are
similar.

In the first few decades of their existence many claims

of success were made.

These facilities were "curing" criminals, the

mentally disturbed, and the mentally retarded.

By the 1890’s no one

believed that these facilities were completing their missions.

At

the same time the popular acceptance of social Darwinism and the

eugenics movement changed the nature and function of these institutions.

These institutions changed from being concerned about their clients’

well-being to protecting society from criminals, the mentally disturbed, and the retarded, who were perceived with fear and thought to

be dangerous in relation to societal interests.

With the influx of

such thinking, the institutions began to deteriorate rapidly.

By

establishing a dramatically unequal power distribution between staff
and clients, removing activities from public view, and finding it

necessary to control and regiment the behavior of residents while at
the same time suffering from severe resource shortages, the facilities

eventually become citadels of degradation and dehumanization for
residents.
are for
It seems that any argument which assumes that prisons
are for
punishment and mental health and retardation institutions

treatment is making erroneous assumptions.

The present author believes

prevent criminal behavior is
that any society which does not try to

closings its eyes to reality.

Though present day understanding of

lacking, research which
the causes of criminal behavior is sorely

towards identifying
utilizes the treatment model and is oriented
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effective interventions appears to be warranted.

If effective inter-

ventions became known, it would be wise to apply them regardless of
the issue of criminal responsibility.

The present author’s concern

over criminal responsibility does not revolve around the idea that
some offenders should be punished and others treated but, rather,

originates from the idea that persons who are not criminally responsible should not receive any "services" at the direction of the court

unless certain other conditions are present (their behavior strongly
indicates that they are a danger to the community and there is a

guarantee that appropriate services can be provided.)
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CHAPTER

VI

NORMALIZATION

Raveriel and Bush (1976) believe that the recent improvements in

services for the mentally retarded in this country are primarily
due to the acceptance of the principle of normalization as the

philosophical base for changing and developing these services (Mesiboy,
1976).

The present author, however, believes that normalization has

not been accepted by most professionals in the field beyond the verbal
level, as evidenced by the conditions which still too frequently
exist.

There has been, however, a trend toward change in the last

ten years which appears to be gaining momentum, and the changes

which have occurred usually have shown the effects of normalization.
The author, observing this trend and bringing some degree of optimism
to bear,

can easily envision

a time when normalization will be

typically evidenced by the service system for the retarded in the

United States,
The philosophy within the field of retardation, therefore, appears
to be changing from one based on fear and revulsion toward the

retarded to one

of,

action on behalf of individuals possessing develop-

mental potential and human and legal rights.

Because of the growing

disabilities
importance of normalization in the field of developmental
to the discussion
and, because this concept appears to be relevant

this chapter.
of criminal responsibility, it is examined in

In addition

its application in mental
to exploring the meaning of the concept,
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retardation systems and its meaning for the criminal justice system
are included.

The Concept of Normalization

The concept of normalization was first used by Bank-Mikkelsen,
head of the Danish Mental Retardation Service, when he stated that
the retarded should experience an existence as normal as possible
(cited in Nirje, 1969).

Bank-Mikkelsen was able to convince the

legislative body to include this principle in the 1959 Danish law
regarding services for the mentally retarded.

Nirje (1969) was the

first person to elaborate the principle and publish it in the

United States.

According to Nirje, normalization "refers to a

cluster of ideas, methods, and experiences expressed in practical

work for the mentally retarded" as adopted in the Scandanavian
countries.

Normalization means "making available to the mentally

retarded, patterns and conditions of everyday life which are as

close as possible to the norms and patterns of the mainstream of
society."

This principle is not meant to apply only to a subgroup of

the mentally retarded population but, rather, to all of these persons

including severly and profoundly retarded individuals and those who
are multipli- handicapped

.

The Joint Commission of the Accreditation of

retardation
Hospitals, the major standard setting body for mental
principle
services in the United States, has adopted and defined the
for Residentia l
of normalization in its handbook entitled Standards
of means whicn
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (1975) as "the use
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are as culturally normative as possible to elicit and maintain behavior
which, is as culturally normative as possible, taking into account

legal and subcultural differences."

The most comprehensive treatment

of the normalization concept has been produced by Wolf ensberger (1972).

His definition states that normalization is the "utilization of means
which, are as culturally normative as possible, in order to establish

and/or maintain personal behaviors and characteristics which are as

culturally normative as possible"

(p.

28).

These definitions seem to

indicate that the normalization principle is culture-bound in that

each culture has its own standards for behavior.

"Normative" refers

to statistics rather than morals and could be conceived as that which

is typical.

-

The normalization principle is based upon the reasonable assumption
that a normative environment elicits and maintains normative behavior.

On the other hand, environments which are significantly different than
that found in society lead to the development and maintenance of

behavior which is maladaptive in society.

It seems obvious that

placing an individual with a learning disability in an environment
further
which encourages the development of inappropriate behavior

handicaps that person should he return to society.
the concept of
Many authors have written about problems with

normalization.

become
Throne 0-975) contends that the retarded

procedures have been attempted
identified as such only when normative
and have failed.

since the
Therefore, normalization is misleading

to normative procedures.
retarded do not develop normally in response
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Throne calls for the application of extraordinary procedures for
speeding up the developmental rate for retarded persons and sees

normative procedures as perpetuating the same retarded developmental
rates which they were responsible for establishing in the first place.
This criticism of normalization has taken a superficial view of a

deceptively complex principle.

which are as normative

as^

When Wolf ensberger calls for "procedures

possible," he obviously intends a great

deal of flexibility in procedures to establish the desired end, a normal

developmental rate.

However, procedures must deviate as little as

possible from cultural norms in meeting desired goals, and a blanket
statement that different procedures must he used for the retarded

without stipulating that these procedures must deviate minimally
from culturally normative ones leaves the door open for establishing

more of the faulty institutions which are all too prevalent in our
society and which in the author *s opinion, deprive the retarded living

within them from experiencing a normal existence, thus leading to the
development of maladaptive behavior.

Mesibov

( 1976 )

acknowledges that the normalization principle has

been extremely valuable but sees a need for additional refinement
of the concept.

As with any such concept, normalization should be

continually re-examined and refinements and changes made when
appropriate.

A major difficulty has been that while normalization is

intuitively appealing as a concept, there are no acceptable criteria,
for evaluating the effectiveness of the normalization model against

alternative formulations.

Thus, normalization is not readily amenable
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to confirmation or refutation.

Edgerton, Eyman, and Silver stein (1975) have noted that there has

been little effort to clarify what exactly is meant by normalization.
For example, what is meant by "local" or "subculture" standards?
do we determine what the standards of the majority are?

How

How does one

establish, when a strict interpretation of normalization should be

violated?

And how can we identify the optimal point at which the

mentally retarded individual experiences a maximum of growth and
development?

These questions continue to be unanswered, and it

appears that no simple answers exist.

While we may, at some point,

be able to better answer such, questions as how to specify subculture
standards, it is unlikely that we will ever easily be able to decide
to what extent normative standards should be violated with any
•

given individual.

Since great variability exists among human beings,

and simple consistent formulae for action appear impossible, the

most valuable product of the normalization principle is probably the

orientation it provides in demanding that we make strenuous efforts
to meet normative standards.

The Application of Normalization

Frequently, it is believed that subscribing to the normalization

principle will enable quality services to be delivered less expensively
persons will
than they are typically provided today and that retarded

retardation
make greater developmental gains, reducing the prevalence of

Nirje,

many retarded
(1969) has stated that normalization can aid
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persons in achieving complete independence and social integration
and that many who will always require assistance will make developmental

gams

due to normalization.

No one is seen as being immune to the

beneficial effects of this principle.

Normalization has two major implications (Wolf ensberger
pp.

,

1972,

31-42); the first is concerned with the interactions between the

mentally retarded individual and his environment, and the second is
concerned with how the retarded are perceived by others.

Regarding interactions, normalization dictates that we maximize
the behavioral competence of the retarded person which should lead
to normative interactions with other individuals and inanimate

objects in the environment.

While services are in existence which

increase the behavioral repertoire of the retarded, this increase, in
and of itself is not sufficient.

For example, expanding the vocabulary

of a person is not sufficient if pronunciation and speech patterns are

not similar to what is culturally accepted and the mentally retarded

individual who displays this verbal deviance from accepted community
standards requires programmatic interventions to ameliorate this
difference.

Another example lies in the area of nutrition.

Assuring

that individuals receive nutritious diets is important but does not

totally meet the requirements of normalization.

If a person's weight

is outside of the normal range as dictated by the community, then

efforts to change his weight accordingly are indicated.
In terms of the interaction between the retarded person and his
attend
inanimate environment, the building within which persons live,
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school, work, and engage in leisure time activities assumes a position
of extreme importance.

If these structures prohibit individuals from

developing behaviors which are typically learned by the rest of
society, then they violate the principle of normalization and result
in retarding the development of a person who is already develop-

mentally disabled.

Obviously, buildings can facilitate the develop-

ment of skills and habits.
of buildings abound.

Examples which demonstrate this power

If toilets have no facilities for toilet

paper or towels, persons in that environment never learn to use toilet

paper appropriately or to wash their hands after going to the bathroom.
If, in addition, large groups of persons sleep in large overcrowded

rooms, the concepts of personal space and property can never fully

develop.

Such an environment leads- to ownership being determined by

possession, and stealing in such a situation is encouraged.

Visitors

to institutions in different states cannot help but be aware of

similar bizzare behavior among residents who may be thousands of

miles apart.

One behavior which is evidenced is the stuffing of

possessions under one's shirt at all times except when showering or
sleeping.

Questioning of individuals who engage in this practice quickly

reveals that it is an effective, technique to maintain ownership of
possessions.

making.

Building design can even effect behavior such as decision

A physical environment which denies

a person access to his

clothes
clothes, obviously prevents him from learning to decide which
to wear on a given day.

affected
The perception of the retarded individual by others is also
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by normalization.

The more a retarded person's behavior differs

from cultural norms, the more he is perceived as deviant.

Such a

perception increases the probability of the person being rejected
and encourages the development and maintenance of non-normative

behavior.

Examples abound in our service system for the retarded

which adversly effect society's perceptions of the developmentally
disabled.

The presence of large institutions which are separate

from the rest of society implies that the individuals within are so

different that they cannot participate in normal living.

The

dilapidated condition of many of these facilities and the absence of

minimal standards of decency, such as privacy during showering or
the presence of toilet paper in bathroom, leads to the perception
that the retarded are devalued human beings little better than animals.

The existence of security screens or bars on windows in residential
buildings and the over-emphasis on security leads to the perception
of the retarded as dangerous.

The blatent absence of the normalization principle in services for
the retarded sets up a circular chain of inevitable events, a self

fulfilling prophecy.

Figure 3 demonstrates this relationship.

As

can be seen, placing a person in an institution for the retarded, in
person
and of itself, devalues the person and leads to the retarded

being perceived as less than human.

The resultant behavior which

institution and
develops because of the abnormal environment in the
and others further
the affected interaction between the retarded person
in these
reinforces the belief that the retarded must be placed
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Person develops
culturally
maladaptive
behavior

A

Y
different than
s imilar
subhuman
;

Fig.

3.

Interaction
between the
>- retarded person
and others is
different than
that which is
culturally
normative

Saif reinforcement effects of non-normalized services
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institutions.

Obviously, a major tenet of the normalization principle is that

the retarded should be integrated into the mainstream of society.
Wolf ensberger (1972, P. 48) defines integration as ’’consisting of
those practices and measures which maximize a person's (potential)

participation in the mainstream of his culture.”

Integration can only

be achieved when the individual lives in a culturally normal setting
in normal housing, moves and communicates in ways that are typical
for his age, and is able to use community resources such as hospitals,

restaurants, theatres, stores, etc.

The use of these and other

community facilities, however, only represents physical integration.

Unless social integration, whereby the retarded person is intermingled

with non-handicapped persons, is also included, the integration
process is incomplete.
As the above indicates, normalization mandates that the retarded

be treated the same as other persons in society as much as possible

.

The implimentation of normalization theoretically not only benefits
the retarded individual hut also society.

Establishing conditions

which maximize the independence of the individual minimizes the
society
amount of support which society must provide and enriches

non-retarded.
by increasing the interaction between the retarded and

community by
Such as increase in interaction can only enrich the

exposing individuals to the full range of humanity.
criminal
Normalization is obviously relevant to the issue of

responsibility.

the label
The principle dictates that simply applying
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of retardation to a person does not mean that the
individual should

be treated any differently than others while allowing that
different

treatment may sometimes be necessary.

However, the point at which

different treatment becomes appropriate is not clear, and the principle
offers no guidance other than to indicate that whenever possible all

persons should be treated equally before the law and careful thought
should be given in determining when special options become appropriate.
In the past, tests have been adopted by various states to determine

when an offender should be given special status and relieved of
criminal responsibility.

These tests, however, have proved to be

unsatisfactory.

The reader will recall that the concept of mens rea gave birth to

these tests, and while the utility of these tests is highly questionable,
mens rea as a guiding principle may not be either misleading or useless.
As Chapter I showed, for an act to be considered criminal a ''guilty

mind" must also be in evidence.

That is, the offender must have moral

knowledge and knowledge of consequences concerning his behavior,
intentions, and motives.

This definition obviously focuses on the

criminal act, and that focus, in and of itself, is the problem with
the way mens rea is used in the area of criminal responsibility.
Suppose, for example, that a retarded person who is so severly handiacts, attacks
capped that no one would consider him responsible for his

another individual and injures him.

person states that hitting

Upon questioning, the retarded

another person is wrong and that he

he could injure
attacked the person because he was angry and knew that
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the individual.

Such responses meet the dictates of mens rea and

therefore, this retarded person should theoretically be considered

responsible.

Obviously, this situation is not acceptable.

mens rea implies the ability to make informed

,

However,

rational decisions.

The reader will note that this implication goes beyond the alleged
criminal act and takes into account how the person makes decisions
in general.

Considering how an offender makes decisions in all

spheres. of his life would appear to provide a wealth of information
in deciding whether or not someone is responsible for his actions.

The author, in fact, seriously questions how juries use the criminal

responsibility tests prescribed by various states.

It is likely

that, while the court attempts to focus on the criminal act itself,

jurists are influenced by the behavior exhibited by the defendant in
other areas.

The ability to make informed, rational choices is also important
in the area of competence and guardianship.

Guardianship has been

defined as a ’'legal mechanism for substitute decision making"
(Kindred, 1976).

The need for guardianship is predicated on the

inability of the ward to make informed, rational decisions.

The

question of whether or not someone needs a guardian is answered in an

incompetency hearing.

Someone who is found to be incompetent loses

to drive a
civil rights and cannot do such things as obtain a license

property, or register
car, establish a checking account, buy or sell
to vote.

criminal responIt would seem that the issues of competency and
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sibility are closely related and this relationship has roots in the

birth of the United States.

Jefferson, in writing the Declaration

of Independence , stated that "We hold these truths to be self-evident:

that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator

with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments

are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent
of the governed.

..

."As Becker 0-951, p. 14) has indicated, this

statement can be reduced to four principles.

First, man is subject

to the law of nature which is the revelation of the will of God.

Second, all men have certain natural rights.

Third, the only

justification of government is to secure these rights for men.

And

fourth, all just governments derive their security and power from the

consent of the governed.

Retarded persons ajudicated incompetent not

only lose civil rights and thus personal freedom to pursue happiness
as they see fit, but they also lose the right to vote, and thus,
they are governed without consent.

These losses occur not because

they have committed acts which lead society to conclude that they

are unworthy of these rights hut, rather, because they suffer from
they
a handicapping condition which. leads others to conclude that

cannot make rational, informed decisions.
would seem
The loss of freedom experienced by incompetent persons
to affect responsibility for violation of the law.

Responsibility and

(Gustafson
freedom have a strong relationship in American society

t,

Laney,

it is difficult to see how
1968, p. 61 and Roberts, 1965, p. 13), and
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society can limit someones freedom through an incompetency
hearing and
yet not allovr this decision to affect the issue of
responsibility.
It would seem more reasonable that limits on personal
freedom due to

incompetency should also limit the responsibility associated with
actions by the incompetent individual.

Summary and Conclusions

Within the field of retardation there has been a growing trend
toward change.

The philosophical base for this change has been the

concept of normalization, which can be defined as the use of means

which are as culturally normative as possible in order to establish
and/or maintain personal behavior and characteristics which are as

culturally normative as possible.

While this concept has certain

difficulties in its application, such as determining when means
or ends are as normative as possible, its primary value lies in the

orientation it provides.

That is, retarded persons should be treated

as other individuals unless treatment differences can be justified.
'

With, such an orientation, simply the label of retardation does not

imply different treatment.

The application of the normalization principle should assist the
retarded in developing behavior which is considered normal by society.
This positive behavior change originates from two sources.

First,

of
education of the retarded should have as a goal the development

culturally
normal behavior, and placing the retarded individual in a

normative environment should assit in eliciting and maintaining

’
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behavior which is normal.

Second, the more retarded persons are

capable of demonstrating normal behavior and seen as living
in a
normal manner

,

the more others will perceive the retarded as more

similar than different from the rest of society.

This should

lead to the retarded being treated in a more normal manner
by others
and thus, the development of normative behavior will be encouraged.

While normalization calls for treating the retarded normally, it
does allow for deviation.

The question for the criminal justice

system to decide is when a retarded offender should be treated

differently and thus be relieved of criminal responsibility.

Unfortun-

ately, normalization does not provide an answer to this question.

It

is obvious that previous tests based upon the concept of mens rea

have proved inadequate.

The present author, however, believes that

the problem with the interpretation of mens rea has been that it

focuses on the criminal act where in the case of retarded persons, it

would seem that a consideration of the individual's ability level, in
general, would be more appropriate.

Mens Rea can be interpreted to

also include the ability to make informed, rational choices.

This

shift in focus would de-emphasiza the criminal act itself and stress
the ability of the offender to make choices.

Interpreting mens rea as the ability to make choices clearly brings
up the issues of guardianship and competency.

Since a guardian is

essentially a substitute decision-maker, a finding of incompetence
signifies the inability to make choices.

A legal determination

that the
of an individual's incompetency would appear to indicate
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person should not be criminally liable for two reasons.

First, a

determination that an individual’s incompetency would appear to
indicate that the person should not be criminally liable for two
reasons.

First, a determination that an individual’s decision-making

ability is so deficient that a loss of personal freedom and civil
rights becomes necessary clearly indicates that a normative approach
in legal matters is not appropriate.

Second, historically,

responsibility and freedom go hand in hand in the United States, and

severlv curtailing someone’s freedom because of a handicapping
condition would appear to imply that the responsibility such a person
assumes should also be curtailed.
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CHAPTER

VII

CONCLUSIONS

Since moat of our practices concerning the determination of

criminal responsibility have historical roots prior to 1843 and have
proved unsatisfactory or unworkable in many instances, the present

work can be viewed as

a

challenge to our legislators and criminal

justice system administrators to pull the issue out of the mire
created by false beliefs and past knowledge gaps.

The current author,

however, believes that to present his recommendations as ultimate solu-

tions would be naive.

Rather, these recommendations should be viewed

as a set of ideas, some new, some not so new, which may function

toward stimulating changes enabling the retarded individual to be

treated fairly by our criminal justice system.

All human service system issues, including the present one, should
be dealt with in a spirit of ongoing research.

Too many times in

the past change efforts in human services which had been viewed as

providing ultimate solutions

,

created with their failures a loss in

motivation toward solving the original problems as evidenced by the
development of prisons, mental health Institutions and mental

retardation institutions.

While we know much more about human behavior

today than we did during the nineteenth century, mankind’s body of

knowledge is always in a state of flux, some ideas being discarded
.as new ones are found.

author
Rather than proffer ultimate solutions, then, the present

with human
proposes that with the issue of criminal responsibility and
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sec vices in general, an action research, approach in
which change

efforts become hypotheses rather than solutions be adopted.

These

hypotheses must include a clear statement of objectives, means, and
assumptions, and also provide a means for validating themselves.
Further, the more readily change efforts can be divided conceptually
into separate components or hypotheses for separate validation, the

better able we will be in..coming to grips with human problems in
our society.

This approach, of course, is common to scientific

endeavors in general.

The "space race" of the late 1950's and early

196Q's, offers an illustration of this research method in action.

The United States was obsessed with "catching up with the Russians"
in space exploration, and many of our attempts to orbit a capsule

around the earth had ended in failure.

Because the United States

was so determined to close the gap perceived between this country and
the Soviet Union, one of the most dramatic all-encompassing research

efforts of all time wa3 launched.

The system being explored

was

conceptualized as the rocket, having many components, and thousands
of experiments went into verifing the effectiveness of each component.

Further, experiments, were then conducted to validate the relationships

between these various components.

This incredibly methodical and

thorough approach led eventually to the desired successes, when the
U,S. orbitted a man in space.

This author feels strongly that human

services could benefit greatly from this research approach.
This chapter presents recommendations, many of which will hopefully

prove useful as components of laws or procedures in the criminal justice
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system.

Additionally, a limited conversation of related issues for

those found not criminally responsible will be presented.

The Determination

of;

Criminal Responsibility

The purpose of criminal law is to define and reduce the incidence
of criminal behavior.

In fulfilling their role in meeting this

objective courts in the United States have assumed that persons are
typically responsible for their behavior, and mens rea has been used
as the underlying philosophical principle in developing procedures
to determine whether or not a given offender is to be held respon-

sible,

These procedures must first show that the individual is

suffering from a condition which makes him eligible for such a

consideration and secondly, must demonstrate that the person meets
the requirements established by the test adopted in the particular
state.

Juries typically make these decisions.

This author recommends that persons continue to be considered

responsible unless evidence can be presented which indicates otherwise,

Mens rea should be maintained as a guiding principle, but its

interpretation should be broadened to mean the ability to make rational,
informed decisions.

While broadening the definition of mens rea would still call for

a

complaints
subjective judgement, and this subjectivity is one of the
would bring
frequently voiced in regard to criminal responsibility, it
factors.
mens rea into line with competency and guardianship

The

incorapetency with tne
establishment of laws which equate a finding of
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inability to assume responsibility for any violation
of criminal codes
can remove decisions regarding criminal responsibility
from the

emotionally charged atmosphere which frequently accompanies
criminal
trials.

The development of procedures within states that dictate

that all retarded persons who are eighteen or over be periodically

evaluated regarding their competency and need for guardianship

would appear to be valuable.

Such a procedure would potentially pro-

vide increased agreement in these decisions by removing the determination of criminal responsibility from the atmosphere generated by
behavior which society sees as harmful.
To clarify the types of conditions which call for such a consider-

ation, the definition adopted by the American Association on Mental

Deficiency should be adopted on behalf of the retarded individual.
That is, retardation is demonstrated by a "significantly subaverage

general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits
in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period."

A retarded person could, therefore, be identified only by acceptable
testing instruments and procedures which measure intelligence and

adaptive behavior.

Since all of these instruments present some problems,

tests which are the least problematic should be selected.

Obviously,

better tools are needed and as they are developed, they should replace
existing ones.

States, however, must identify which instruments and

procedures are acceptable,

In order for a conclusion of retardation

least
to be reached both intelligence and adaptive behavior must be at

two standard deviations below the mean.

159

The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals through
its

manual entitled Standards for Residential Facilities for the
Mentally
Ret arded (1975) is serving in a leadership capacity in the
field of

mental retardation, and many of the standards specified in the manual
are being adopted by state legislatures and by the federal government
in reimbursement programs.

One part of these standards calls for

interdisciplinary evaluations of retarded persons once a year.

These

evaluations are supposed to be comprehensive in nature and lead to
the indent if icat ion of developmental and other needs and also to the

specification of programs to meet these needs.

While many states

are calling for annual evaluations by interdisciplinary teams, they

are not, at this time, mandating that these teams also evaluate the
decision-making ability of clients in order that recommendations
regarding competency and guardianship can be made to the court.

If,

however, comprehensive evaluations were conducted annually; questions

determining decision-making ability, competency, and guardianship
needs were addressed to retarded persons eighteen years and older;

conclusions that an individual is not capable of making rational
and informed decisions were presented to courts so that competency and

guardianship decisions could be made; and the inability to make

decisions was equated with the inability to be criminally responsible;
the issue of criminal responsibility would be resolved before criminal

acts occurred.

Since a number of states have two types of guardianship, guardianship of person and guardianship of estate, clarification is in order.

Guardianship of estate simply means that the individual lacks the
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ability to make informed decisions regarding assets.

Guardianship

of estate does not involve a general loss
of civil rights such as

voting.

In Contrast, guardianship of the person signifies that
the

individual cannot make rational decisions in many of life’s
spheres
and a general loss of civil rights is involved.

Therefore, the

present author believes only guardianship of the person should be

indicative of the inability to assume criminal responsibility.
Laws regarding competency and guardianship are usually inadequate
(Brakel & Rock, 1971, p, 251).

Frequently, states do not clearly

define conditions which may warrant guardianship but include such
terms as "insanity”, "lunatic", etc.

Other states do not address the

subject of ability per se but state that the existence of any diagnostic
label determines in itself the need for guardianship.

At times, the

fact that a person lives x^ithin a mental retardation institution is

taken as proof that guardianship is required
level.

,

irrespective of ability

Obviously, the present author believes that the definition of

mental retardation presented previously should be adopted as identifying
a condition where the possibilities of incompetency and need of guardian

ship should be considered and not automatically assumed.

Institution-

alization should also not be assumed to imply incompetency.

The determination of incompetency and guardianship needs should
occur only through hearings, which, as Allen, Ferster, and Weihofen
and must
(1968, pp. 83-89) have shown, are frequently casual affairs

be changed if they are to assist society in criminal matters.

In

proceedings to establish incompetency, factual events which demonstrate
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the person’s ability or lack thereof are theoretically
required to be
presented.

Often, this theoretical requirement is not met, and state-

ments introduced as evidence often consist merely of opinions and
conclusions reached by a physician with no specification presented of
the facts upon which the conclusions were based.

Since these proceedings can mean the loss of civil rights and, if
the recommendations made in this chapter are adopted, will determine

an individual’s standing before the criminal court, it is imperative
that safeguards be adopted which better enable the court to make

just decisions.

Therefore, it is recommended that those alleged

incompetent have legal counsel at these hearings and that evidence be
limited to behavior and facts which indicate decision-making ability.

Recommendations regarding competency should only be made by inter-

disciplinary teams.

The counsel for the alleged incompetent should

also have at his disposal an interdisciplinary team which can make

upon request, an independent determination of decision-making ability.

Adopting the recommendations specified in this chapter would give
courts the knowledge of whether or not an offender is criminally

responsible outside of the context of a harmful act.

Retarded adults

who are known to the mental retardation system would have either been

determined to be incompetent or competent before any harmful act has
occurred.

However, there would still be occasions when a retarded

individual not known to the retardation service system might commit
a criminal act.

If such as individual has been living independently

and therefore, demonstrating that he is capable of making informed
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decisions, then that person would be held responsible
for criminal
acts.

In situations where retarded offenders are living
with others

who it can be demonstrated function in a guardianship
capacity without
legal sanction, the question of criminal responsibility
can be raised.

Laws and procedures providing guidance for judges in these
cases must
be established.

Chapter IV demonstrated that some ability exists to

categorize retarded persons so that an estimate of their abilities
can be determined.

Persons who are mildly retarded are typically

able to live completely independently and usually ''disappear" into
society.

Moderately retarded persons can sometimes be competitively

employed and many achieve independent functioning.

Sever ly and

profoundly retarded individuals need supervision, cannot work competitively, and need assistance and supervision in such basic tasks as

bathing and eating.

Therefore, it is recommended that persons

classified as mildly retarded be treated as responsible and severly
and profoundly retarded individuals be regarded as not responsible.

Only in the case of moderate retardation does the issue of criminal

responsibility become, debatable.

Since this work argues for the use

of intelligence tests and adaptiye behavior results in determining

diagnosis and category, and since these data can be conflicting, two

additional recommendations are made.

First, differing results

between intelligence and adaptive behavior tests should be resolved
in favor of the higher score as indicated in Chapter IV.

Second,

when the prosecuting and defense attorneys present different information,
the court should mandate an independent evaluation, and power to make
the final decision as to category should reside with the judge.
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If a judge decides that severe or
profound retardation exists

and thus, that the individual cannot be held
responsible or make

informed decisions, a finding of incompetence and
the assignment of
a guardian should follow.

A determination of mild retardation

implies the ability to make rational, informed decisions
and such persons should be held responsible.

Moderate retardation, however,

represents the gray area where questions of responsibility must
be
determined by a hearing.

These decisions should be made outside of

the context of criminal proceedings.

Hearings which conform with the

recommendations for such hearings provided above should be held
regarding competency and guardianship.

'Related Problems

A finding that someone is not responsible does not totally resolve
the matter, for it must also be determined whether or not the individual

committed the alleged act and if so, what disposition should be made.

These decisions can only be made by our judicial system, which means
that a guardian and counsel must be assigned to the offender.

Persons

who are not held to be responsible for their behavior and have been
shown to have committed illegal acts should not be subject to either
the criminal justice system or the mental retardation service system

unless the following condition is met.

It must be shown by behavior

and not by inferences nor conclusions that the person presents a threat
to others and will probably continue committing harmful acts.

again is a subjective judgement, and a threat to others may be

This
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constituted by threat of bodily harm or a violation of property rights.
Individuals who are perceived as presenting a continual threat to

society should be placed in the least restrictive environment where
they will receive reasonable supervision.

This should be determined

primarily by the seriousness of the harmful acts.

Treatment in such a

setting must be available, and the court, since it is committing the
individual, must assume the responsibility for reviewing the adequacy
of treatment to assure that it meets minimal standards.

The present

author, however, does not believe that habilitation or rehabilitation

should be limited to retarded offenders.

Any society which does

not attempt to establish a responsible citizenry has its head buried
in the sand, and while there are problems with the treatment approach
as discussed in Chapter Vj'if expanded to include an evaluation of

the individual and his environment, it can lead to the discovery and

development of interventions which assist the criminal justice system
in meeting its objectives.

When making commitments of persons not

judged to be criminally responsible courts must mandate that facilities

specify what the goals of treatment are and periodically evaluate

whether or not the goals of their treatment have been met.

As soon

from involuntary
as these goals are met, the person should be free

commitment.

illegal
In any case, an involuntary commitment for

longer than that called
activity should include a time limit which is no

for in the criminal codes.

In order to extend this time limit, the

person, through his
facility must be able to demonstrate that the
and present danger
observable behavior continues to present a clear
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safety of others.

These proceedings should be adversary in

nature and the committed individual should be represented by a
guardian and counsel.

Extended involuntary commitments should be

reviewed at least annually.
Obviously, the recommendations made in this chapter call for more
than the writing of new laws and procedures.

The education of

professionals within the criminal justice system is also necessary
for such changes to be realized.

Additionally, the education of these

professionals should go beyond the issue dealt with in this work if
the retarded are ever to experience justice in our courts.

As

Harrow (1976) has indicated, retarded persons are frequently not
recognized by criminal justice professionals, and therefore, many of
the rights built into the system to protect accused persons from

erroneously being convicted are not realized by the retarded.

For

example, the Miranda decision which mandates that defendants be

appraised of their constitutional rights can be confusing to someone
of normal intelligence who is caught up in the emotional state

accompanying arrest.

For the retarded person, an additional nandicap

exists which makes the understanding of these rights even more difficult.
of
Until society becomes educated regarding the needs and limitations

regardthe retarded and builds in procedures to assure these rights

commodity for
less of a person’s limit actions, justice will be a rare

individuals who possess developmental disabilities.
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